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ABSTRACT 
This thesis contains an evaluation of the impact of enterprise agreements on Australian 
labour productivity and wage earnings between 1992 and 2003. 
After almost a century of centralised industrial relations decision making, enterprise level 
bargaining provided employers and employees with the opportunity to negotiate working 
conditions and wages. The policy to introduce enterprise level bargaining was implemented 
as part of extensive microeconomic reform designed to improve the international 
competitiveness of the Australian economy. The industrial relations policy objective was to 
improve productivity by increasing technical and allocative efficiency at the enterprise level. 
The conclusions are that the introduction of enterprise agreements has contributed positively 
and significantly to labour productivity and that wage earnings are positively and significantly 
influenced by labour productivity. Both of these findings are significant. Australian labour 
productivity had previously been primarily influenced by growth in output, while wage 
earnings had been based on cost of living adjustments. 
There is preliminary evidence to suggest that by internalising bargaining over wage and 
conditions, enterprises have used the bargaining process to introduce significant change 
and the agreement to formalise these changes. 
The findings are based on a policy evaluation framework. This requires a comprehensive 
approach and as such the following perspectives are included: 
• Policy evaluation; 
• Organisational design, management and industrial relations theory and practice and their 
convergence; 
• Production theory and productivity measurement; and 
• Wages and wage earnings models. 
Econometric techniques are used to quantify the impact of introducing enterprise level 
agreements. Generalised least squares and fixed effects modelling is applied to determine 
the impact of introducing enterprise agreements on labour productivity and wage earnings 
respectively. The analysis focuses on both the impact on the economy overall and within the 
production/resources, margins and service sectors. 
The enterprise agreement data set comprises Department of Employment and Workplace 
Relations (DEWR) unpublished data relating to enterprise agreements registered in the 
federal jurisdiction from 1992 to 2003. This is combined with ABS industry level data. 
The impact of enterprise level agreements on productivity is modelled using an expanded 
Cobb Douglas production function applied at the economy and sectoral levels. 
The impact of decentralised agreements on wage earnings is modelled using empirical 
approaches consistent with Reserve Bank of Australia and international studies. 
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CHAPTER ONE - THE BACKGOUND TO INDUSTRIAL AND 
WORPLACE WORKPLACE REFORM IN AUSTRALIA 
1.1. Introduction and Thesis Objective 
Australian governments of the 1980's, along with industry and labour institutions, recognised that 
full participation in the increasingly global economy was being constrained by the nature of the 
country's economic structures and policies. The recognition led to significant microeconomic 
reform. From an industrial relations (IR) perspective the focus of microeconomic reform was to 
increase the economy's competitiveness through increased productivity. 
As a result the economy and its workplaces underwent significant reform in the 1980's and 1990's. 
During the 1980's established institutional arrangements and practices were dismantled under 
microeconomic reform policy. The exchange rate was floated, corporations and governments 
dramatically reduced staffing levels, services were outsourced, tariffs reduced and the economy, its 
institutions and businesses opened up in an attempt to reflect the characteristics of the global 
economy and to achieve economic competitiveness. 
The reform agenda included the decentralisation of the prevailing rigid system for establishing 
wage rates and conditions of employment. The agenda's two major initiatives were the introduction 
of enterprise level bargaining and a focus on productivity improvement. 
This transition to a productivity focus emerged from collaboration between the federal labour 
government and the union movement. From 1983 to 1996, the Australian IR framework was 
dominated by a series of Accords between Australian trade unions, Australian businesses and the 
Australian government. These Accords introduced partial wage indexation, a substantial change 
from the full indexation principles that had traditionally applied and established a principle that 
continued until 2006 when the notion of broadly based safety net adjustments for base level 
workers was introduced. While this policy created some stability in wage adjustments for business 
investors; it reduced Australian real wages by over 10 percent in the 13 years of the Labour 
Government and in this way contributed to the rapid growth of Australian employment. However the 
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weakness of these Accord agreements was their failure to correct restrictive workplace practices 
which were partly responsible for a 2.3 percent decline in productivity over the same period. 
The Labour Government had recognised these problems and moved to elevate the status of 
enterprise bargaining in the Australian IR system. In 1993, this resulted in the introduction of 
Enterprise Bargaining Agreements (EBAs), a system within which employers could collectively 
bargain to establish wages and conditions that reflected the specific needs of the players involved. 
Importantly the Awards that had dominated the industrial landscape became subservient to the 
enterprise agreement. Unions were centrally placed as bargaining units in this negotiation process. 
The change to a Liberal-National party coalition government in 1996 led to the decentralisation of 
the bargaining system with bargaining agreements being more flexibly determined within minimum 
standards and removal of the requirement for union involvement. Interestingly few non-union 
agreements have been registered. 
These significant changes to the manner in which wage rates were fixed, reflects a broader, 25 
year long restructuring of the Australian economy. Designed to improve the country's relative 
performance in the global economy, these, and indeed current reforms, have often been 
contentious in both introduction and evolution. In particular, the industrial relations reforms, with 
their direct impact on long established wage setting practices and on the traditional roles and 
distribution of power between industry and employee organisations, resulted in acrimonious and 
ongoing debate. Change generally leads to some people trading off current certain benefits for 
uncertain benefits, while others perceive any change in the current state as a threat. There is little 
quantitative evaluation of the impact of these reforms on the economy and society in establishing 
the consequences of the changes, or their causal factors. Consequently the evolution of these 
reforms and the increasing decentralisation of the industrial relations system attracts debate more 
centred on ideology than on a demonstration of its impact and estimation of the likely future impact 
of additional reform. 
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The drivers for this prolonged period of reform have been premised on Australia's position as a 
small, open economy, in a large global market place and the need to achieve globally competitive 
productivity levels as the means of maintaining a high standard of living. It is demonstrated later in 
this thesis that Australia's relative productivity achieves world's best practice in relatively few 
sectors. 
Both government and industry influenced the transition from a fully centralised, judicial industrial 
relations and wage fixing model towards an enterprise based model. The centralised, inflexible 
system was judged to be contradictory to the dynamic nature of the global market and a constraint 
on the competitiveness of Australian export and import replacement businesses. The protectionist 
nature of many Australian government policies, including full wage indexation and inefficient 
employment conditions, were established following federation and remained entrenched in the 
1970's. Mulvey (1997) claims the economy's capacity to apply these principles was created by the 
high relative productivity of key export sectors. As a result of a deteriorating terms of trade 
performance post World War 2 and oil price shocks experienced in 1974 and 1978, the Australian 
economy had no further capacity to maintain full indexation and inefficient work practices without 
experiencing unacceptable balance of payments and foreign debt outcomes. Wooden (2001) 
identified that Australian policy makers consequently recognised the need for urgent reform to both 
policy and the decision making institutions. 
Many institutional and policy players took the view that labour market reform was required for 
Australia's competitiveness. The wage structure was considered inconsistent with allocative 
efficiency, Mulvey (1997), because it was compressed, inflexible and unrelated to the needs of 
individual firms, while technical efficiency was compromised by extensive demarcation and 
restrictive work practices. The modernisation of the industrial relations system became a major 
focus of Australia's microeconomic reform as a consequence of these conclusions. The creation of 
minimum industrial relations standards allowed many centralised industrial relations decisions to be 
transferred to the enterprise level of the economy, while still protecting the interests of employees 
who exercised minimal bargaining power. This reform was a significant change from the previous 
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system where national standards tended to reflect those negotiated within the successful export 
sectors rather than wages and conditions prevailing economy wide. 
Enterprise level, rather than industry level wage and condition determination, in the form of 
enterprise bargaining agreements (EBAs), was identified as the appropriate strategy for improving 
labour market flexibility and efficiency. EBAs were expected to improve allocative efficiency by 
achieving a wage structure more closely aligned to supply and demand for labour, while technical 
efficiency is achieved by trading away restrictive work practices. The most likely outcome was 
perceived to be improved technical efficiency, Mulvey (1997). 
The Productivity Commission (1999) found that improvement in productivity was the major source 
of increase in Australian standards of living in the 1990s. In the 1970's and 1980s, living standards 
were predominantly improved through expansion in the use of inputs as the economy grew. By the 
mid 1990s the Commission found evidence of a correlation between enterprise bargaining (EB) and 
productivity growth. 
In addition to the focus on industrial relations, the policy agenda included reform of financial, 
education and training processes, intergovernmental relations, trade systems and practices. 
Enterprises have simultaneously introduced significant and complementary organisational reform 
through restructuring, re-engineering processes, introducing new social structures within the 
workplace and by applying management tools focussed on gaining increased commitment and 
contribution from employees. 
The objective of this thesis is to evaluate the impact of introducing Enterprise Bargaining 
Agreements (EBAs) into Australian workplaces on labour productivity and wage earnings and to 
develop an understanding of how resulting outcomes occurred. 
The thesis is structured in accordance with policy evaluation approaches. Policy evaluation is a 
difficult and complex activity. Dror (1968) concludes that evaluating public policymaking is difficult 
not just from its complexity but also from the inclusion of values in its prior development. This is 
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particularly pertinent to industrial relations policy with views split between the relative ascendency 
of capital and labour forming the core of the traditional debate. 
Early approaches to evaluation depended on reductionist, input/output constructs. These were 
narrow in scope and depth and tended to ignore broader system influences and impacts. 
Consequently the capacity for such evaluation to determine causality and to support further policy 
development and processes was limited. Reflecting this developmental need from evaluation, 
Owen (1993) concludes that policy evaluation that fails to determine both the causes and the 
consequences of causal links to results has limited potential to support further development. 
Reflecting this view, Sanderson (2000) argues that evaluation must be based on theoretical 
precepts drawn from underlying social and economic theory for example, in preference to a limited 
perspective based on measuring cause and effect in the goal formation process. The objective of 
theory based evaluation is challenging. Identifying the fact that policies are often implemented in 
different contexts, Weiss (1995) concludes that the determination and testing of theory and 
determination of causal factors is often problematic in determining generalised results. Sanderson 
(2002) argues that it is important to understand why a policy works (or not). He concludes that to 
achieve this there is a need for an appropriate mix of quantitative and qualitative information and 
analysis to identify relationships between processes, contextual factors, organisational and cultural 
changes and performance outcomes. 
Evidence based evaluation (and policy making) implies a degree of certainty in resolving the 
complex question of what works for whom under what circumstances, and why? However the 
complexity surrounding many policy initiatives raises questions of both the ability to predict the 
outcomes of a particular policy and to generate a clear picture of causal inferences. 
The following review of industrial relations and organisation theory and practice provides a 
theoretical context for later analysis. The intensity of policy implementation is demonstrated by the 
uptake of agreements and how enterprises have implemented such negotiation and agreement to 
facilitate complementary organisational changes. 
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This is followed by quantitative analysis of the economy using a mix of theoretical constructs and 
established practice at the macroeconomic and sectoral dimensions. This analysis is in the form of 
econometric modelling that specifically allows for the omission of other potentially significant 
independent variables. This approach provides a set of conclusions reflecting a balanced view of 
the enterprise context and the impact on labour productivity and wage outcomes arising in Australia 
from the introduction of EBAs over the period 1992 to 2003. Economy wide estimation for each 
dependent variable includes the 17 ANSZIC industry classifications making up the economy as a 
whole. The industry classifications include: agriculture, forestry and fishing, mining, manufacturing, 
electricity, gas and water supply, construction, wholesale trade, retail trade, accommodation, cafes 
and restaurants, transport and storage, communications services, finance and insurance, property 
and business services, government administration and defence, education, health and community 
services, cultural and recreational services plus personal and other services. 
To determine whether the impact has had a differed across different sectors of the economy, 
modelling is also applied to three industry groupings. The groupings comprise a 
production/resources sector that includes Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing, Construction, Mining 
and Manufacturing; a services sector comprised of Electricity, Gas and Water services, 
Accommodation, Cafes and Restaurants, Communication services, Property and Business 
services, Government Administration and Defence, Education, Health and Community services, 
Cultural and Recreational services, Personal and Other services and finally, Wholesale Trade, 
Retail Trade, Transport and Storage plus Finance and Insurance, have been categorised as a 
margins sector. 
The thesis is structured in five chapters. In Chapter One, I provide a description of the nature of the 
problem and policy response, the approach to the evaluation of policy performance and the context 
provided by the evolution and application of both organisational design theory and the industrial 
relations framework. 
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In Chapter Two, I examine the issues arising during the transition to the decentralised industrial 
relations system, the evidence of workplace and industrial reform, changes to the established 
bargaining institutions and preliminary evidence of trends in the desired policy outcomes. 
In Chapter Three, I outline the data used to evaluate policy, the modelling foundations and develop 
the equations used to estimate the impact of EBAs on productivity and wages. 
In Chapter Four, I provide the results of modelling and in Chapter Five draw conclusions in relation 
to the success of the enterprise bargaining policy and the comparative benefits of the enterprise 
approach relative to its predecessor and alternatives. 
The remainder of this chapter is dedicated to an overview of the organisational and institutional 
environment in which EBAs, as a mechanism for decentralising industrial relations decisions, has 
occurred. 
It is considered important that the evaluation commences with this overview. The reason for 
including an analysis of organisation and industrial relations theory is two fold. Firstly, while many 
Australian workplaces introduced contemporary management approaches as a means of improving 
productivity and achieving strategic objectives, it is argued that the centralised and rigid structure of 
the Australian economy shielded many sectors and firms from the need to be internationally 
competitive and as a result, they did not actively pursue such approaches. Secondly, by removing 
the need to make wages and employment conditions decisions, many firms neglected to develop 
the management systems and approaches of their overseas contemporaries. Introducing micro 
economic reforms and transferring industrial relations decision making to the enterprise resulted in 
many Australian firms simultaneously introducing organisational change initiatives with new 
bargaining arrangements. Enterprise bargaining became a common vehicle used to introduce and 
formalise contemporary management approaches into Australian workplaces. The following 
sections provide an indication of the scope of ideas, theories and practices introduced within the 
scope of bargaining and why positive results from bargaining were achieved. 
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The connections between management theory and micro-economics also provide an important 
platform for this evaluation. Much of the productivity and wages theory outlined in Chapter Three is 
a quantitative explanation of the organisation and behavioural theory outlined below. These 
theories are considered important causal factors when evaluating the impact of enterprise 
agreements on productivity and wage earnings. 
Changes to the manner in which enterprises arrive at industrial relations decisions occur within a 
complex organisational and institutional framework. Workplace reform is comprised of two 
fundamental elements, reform in the way enterprises are managed to ensure sustainability and 
reform in the manner in which employers and workers negotiate and exercise power to optimise 
benefit. In effect, it is an explanation of how managers manage external and internal influences on 
business sustainability. In most of the 20 th  century, many firms had the internal dimension largely 
managed for them through centralised institutions, introduction of enterprise bargaining caught 
many of them ill prepared, limiting the potential for early gains from enterprise bargaining. 
The balance of the chapter provides a summary of the development of organisation design and 
industrial relations thinking, principles and practice during the period from the industrial revolution, 
through the Harvester Case in 1907 until 2003. The convergence of industrial relations and 
organisation design thinking, culture and process is considered critical to understanding how the 
potential gains from enterprise bargaining are achieved. The key question addressed here is 
whether or not Australian enterprises have after a century of operating under externally developed, 
centralised systems setting employment conditions and wage rates, developed the capability to 
negotiate agreements effectively. 
1.2. Evolution of Organisational Design and Management Theory 
Large scale human endeavour, where the output demanded requires more input than that of an 
individual and in some instances many thousands of individuals, has always required the 
application of management skills and processes. Early European management models occurred 
within the rigid hierarchies and discipline of military and church models. In an industrial context, the 
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emergence of the industrial revolution, characterised by its concentration of production into 
factories and infrastructure created the need to organise large groups of people as the structured 
labour input into the production process in combination with capital, owned by the employer. This 
revolution in production coincides with the majority of the labour force moving from agricultural or 
craft based production system where labour was provided individually or by small groups of 
workers, placed into a concentrated, large group. This larger scale, industrial production system 
created concerns about productivity and the cost of labour for the employer. The industrial 
revolution not only revolutionised the application of technology, it also revolutionised the manner in 
which people worked and relationships between employers and employees. 
Adam Smith (1776) identified the division of labour as a major source of potential productivity 
improvement, thus establishing an early link between management and economics. It is considered 
important to reflect on the ongoing interdependency of these disciplines in providing a systematic 
view of mechanisms applied in the enterprise when seeking optimisation of productivity and wages. 
There are three major and interrelated dimensions within this management perspective, the 
distribution of power and authority within the enterprise reflected in the structure and management 
processes; the characteristics of the task and work performed and the motivation of employees to 
achieve increasingly productive behaviour. 
While the foundations of management span thousands of years, the industrial revolution promoted 
a complementary revolution in management thinking and theory. 
The work of Frederick Taylor (1911) is closely associated with the industrial revolution. Taylor 
based his work on the division of labour principles of previous periods, applying an engineering 
approach to the definition of one best way to perform a task with the dual goals of minimising effort 
and maximising productivity, applying science to the task. In reality Taylor's thinking went far 
beyond this to include the selection of people most suitable for the specific task and then providing 
training specific for the task. Cooperation with employees to ensure work was completed in 
accordance with the principles and science that had been developed for dividing work and 
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responsibility almost equally between management and workers were also part of Taylorism. These 
principles were viewed by Taylor to be the basis of both manager and worker prosperity. Taylor 
was able to demonstrate a productivity improvement of over 200 percent. The Taylorism principles 
have been widely adopted in the US, Europe, Australia, Russia and Japan. 
Henry L Gantt, an associate of Taylor, adapted and extended his theories and approaches. In 
particular, Gantt (1919) introduced incentive schemes for operatives exceeding production 
benchmarks and a bonus for foremen for each of their employees who exceeded the benchmark, in 
this way extending the incentive scheme beyond operatives to include management staff. Gantt 
extended process thinking beyond the act of completing a reduced, specialised task, to include 
program planning and performance management by introducing a chart identifying work planned on 
one axis and time on the other. Still widely used, the approach highlighted the capacity of planning 
and performance management to contribute significantly to productivity improvement. 
The usefulness and acceptance of scientific management lies in the early 20 th century production 
system's high dependency on labour, Robbins, Bergman & Stagg 1997) and the discipline that 
production lines and machinery introduced into work processes. The Taylorist approach enables 
the development of a mass production system, beyond anything previously seen. This production 
system is based on the application of technology and importantly standardisation of both product 
and labour. The resulting improvement in labour productivity had a significant impact in reducing 
product prices, facilitating increased consumption and further production efficiencies. The 
lengthening of production runs through product standardisation, and further enhancement of 
economies of scale and scope were significant in multiplying the productivity benefit from labour 
management reform. A two dimensional approach combining an efficient scale of production with 
real price reductions contributed to increasing standards of living in industrialised countries. 
While making major contributions to improving labour productivity, scientific management was 
generally task or activity based. Other theorists and practitioners of this period took a broader, 
organisation wide perspective to what constituted management. European practitioners such as 
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Fayol (manager of a French coal-mining firm) and Weber (a German sociologist) took an 
administrative approach to the development of management theory. Fayol (1916) developed a set 
of management principles extending scientific management's specialisation and reward 
approaches to include aspects of authority, structure, to supply chains and importantly work and job 
characteristics such as equity, stability and empowerment. Weber (1947) described an ideal form of 
organisation known as bureaucracy. While recognising it did not in reality exist, he provided 
bureaucracy as a basis for theories about work and how work could be performed with large groups 
of people. The Weber bureaucracy, similar to Taylor's scientific management, emphasised 
rationality, predictability, impersonality, technical competence and authoritarianism, but at an 
organisational as opposed to a task oriented level. The resulting theories still provide a partial 
reference point for organisational design. The application of these theories in the early part of the 
20 th  century were the source of significant competitive advantage and an example of the 
importance of improvement in human capital, albeit within an impersonal, technical framework. The 
administrative school increased the scope of standardisation to encompass administrative 
procedures and management techniques, extending thinking beyond Gantts earlier planning 
model. 
The humans as machines characteristic often attributed to scientific management theory is an 
overstatement. Although many of the productivity improvements were technically based, the 
inclusion of more equitable rewards, providing some form of "zero sum" outcome recognised the 
need for cooperation and the satisfaction of employee needs. This approach challenged the view 
that labour supply was homogenous in terms of capability and suitability to tasks. Introduction of 
these approaches at the production and organisation levels resulted in two major developments; 
productivity based wages, creating wage differentials between employees and between industries 
and a differentiated labour supply based on skills and productive capability. This environment is 
conducive to the formation of unions, in particular craft based unions able to negotiate wages and 
conditions reflecting upper limit benchmarks across employers and sectors. 
The focus on the contribution of people to productivity outcomes, albeit primarily through 
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impersonal, technical and dollar based utility approaches, promoted the consideration and 
development of behavioural theories as an explanation of labour productivity. 
Munsterberg (1913) created the field of industrial psychology in his publication "Psychology and 
Industrial Efficiency". Munsterberg suggests the use of psychological testing to improve employee 
selection, identifies the value of learning theory in the development of training and applies the study 
of human behaviour to develop understanding of the most effective techniques for motivating 
employees. He saw these techniques as being complementary to Taylor's approaches, both being 
based on science. 
In addition to a focus on the individual's behaviour in the workplace, the human relations school 
also considered group behaviour in the workplace. Mary Parker Follett was a philosopher and, 
although a contemporary of Taylor, promoted a more people oriented approach to management 
practice, arguing that much individual potential remained as potential only, until it was released 
through group association. This argument implied that the manager's job was to achieve employee 
productivity potential through the management of group behaviour and effort, developing 
partnerships within the group and between management and labour. This approach raised the 
concept of leadership as opposed to authority as a primary management characteristic 
underpinning high work motivation and thus performance. The inclusion of this group dynamics 
dimension underpinned the work of Chester Barnard (1938) argued organisations were cooperative 
social systems. 
These views are important in that they introduce dimensions of productivity which relate to an 
individual's internal motivation to become productive in addition to the traditional external 
motivation of wages and economic incentives. 
The Hawthorne Studies, conducted from 1924 through until 1932, reinforced the finding that group 
pressure and the social norms of the group had more effect on productivity than did economic 
incentives. Mayo (1933) created increased interest in the human factor in production and in 
management approaches that looked beyond wages to promote productivity. 
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More recent technically oriented approaches to workplace reform have emerged from the focus of 
the Japanese economy's mass production system. The Japanese identified their workforce as its 
comparative advantage over the US. Resisting the single task orientation of the traditional mass 
production system and adopting multi-skilling as their job design principle, they adopted a 
continuous improvement model, superseding the one best way model inherent in the mass 
production approach. These diversions from the traditional mass production system were 
responses to both Japan's much smaller internal market and the need for the Japanese to be more 
focused on external demand. This is in contrast to the internally driven supply side focus of the 
original Taylor model applied in the U.S. The result of these changes led to the development of the 
lean production system, a model that migrated to other parts of the world and is currently in 
ascendency in Australia. Matthews (1994) views it as an open system, encompassing production, 
design, co-ordination within the supply chain, customer linkages and the overall management of the 
enterprise. 
Critics view the lean production system as being a mere modification of the mass production 
system and similarly limited in its consideration of the human dimension to work. Regardless it 
demonstrates the progression in thinking and integration of theoretical approaches to achieve 
incremental advances in management and organisation design. 
The post World War 2 period was also characterised by an integration of the management themes 
emerging from the earlier industrial revolution. This integration was driven, in particular by the 
impact of introducing new technology that potentially disrupted the organisational social structures 
established over the preceding fifty years. Trist & Bamford (1951), along with other writers 
associated with the Tavistock Institute, promoted the introduction of new technology in a manner 
minimising disruption on these social structures. As a result of their work in the mining industry, 
they identified that the introduction of new technology reduced productivity until integrated with the 
social needs of the workers. 
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Australian researcher, Fred Emery (1965) published studies on systems theory and thinking. This 
theory and the subsequent work of Woodward (1957), led to the conclusion that management 
techniques should vary relative to the factors present at the time, again challenging the one best 
way tradition. This finding is particularly relevant in the context of the Australian system which was 
then characterised by highly rigid institutional mechanisms and agent principle negotiation and 
decision models. Australian firms managed in a manner reflecting the centralised wage setting 
system. Replacing this with a decentralised system requires different management approaches. 
This allows the scope of management issues to expand to include that of wages and conditions, 
factors largely outside the domain of Australian manager in the centralised system. 
Emery's systems approach encompassed two dimensions, open and closed systems. The open 
system is influenced by external factors, reflecting a dynamic relationship with the business 
environment, a now commonly accepted view. The closed system operates without reference to 
external factors, the basic model applied by Taylor. 
Thinking of the market, workplace and production process as a system provides value when 
considering the dynamics of the mass production system. The scale and price characteristics of the 
mass production system opened up a large scale market, itself attractive to new producers 
competing firstly on price attributes but also on other factors such as quality and critically in their 
ability to be more flexible and adaptive than the rigid, standardised large scale producers. Much of 
this flexibility and quality is arguably derived from a relatively highly motivated workforce and the 
adoption of new technology. Another fundamental difference is that much of the development of the 
mass production system during Taylor's period was supply side oriented, and applied within less 
discerning product markets than those post World War 2. As market expectations grow, the 
capacity of the mass production system to adapt is limited by its rigidity, suggesting that the early 
industrial revolution's mass production system match to Emery's closed system approach. The 
rigidity and externality of the Australian industrial relations system at the time provided a significant 
barrier to encouraging adaptability within enterprises. While it is recognised many Australian firms 
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did apply contemporary management and industrial relations approaches, the external nature of the 
wage fixing system allowed many firms to remain disengaged from such initiatives. 
The development of motivational theory in the 1950's became the reference point for many 
subsequent explanations of employee behaviour. The theories provide a basis for identifying 
appropriate techniques to achieve and importantly to sustain and improve productivity. 
The resultant focus on groups and collective responsibility, performance and reward, is an 
important construct in the Australian industrial relations framework, particularly when applying 
EBAs. It provides a logical structure within which to define the appropriate industrial unit to optimise 
the performance of the enterprise in the relation to their market and competitive advantage, and 
from this, the appropriate bargaining entity. Within some sectors and markets, the appropriate 
bargaining unit is the enterprise level, in others a work unit or team and in others sole individuals. 
The definition is dependent upon how an individual or group can influence the performance and 
productivity of the enterprise. In the Taylor, mass production model, while individual productivity 
could be motivated by incentive, individuals arguably lacked the capacity to affect corporate 
performance. In other sectors, such as the service sector, the role of the individual has much 
greater direct impact on performance. 
Just as the industrial revolution and the mass production system was the catalyst for large scale 
employment creation and the need to develop models to improve the management of individuals 
and groups producing physical outputs, the last 30 years has seen a similar revolution in the 
provision of services. 
In contrast to a physical product, a service is consumed as it is produced, generally as an 
interaction between customers and employees. In this form of transaction, the enterprise is much 
more dependent upon the employee for the quality of service, the satisfaction of the customer and 
resulting impact on the enterprise's reputation compared with the purchase of a product where 
quality can be engineered within the production process. Increased firm dependency on an 
individual is created through high relative levels of both worker autonomy and influence on the 
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consumer's perception of value. This requires the employee's performance to be aligned to the 
purpose and requirements of the enterprise and to be motivated to perform. This business model 
highlights the increased scope in needs that employees satisfy through work. 
Maslow (1954) published a hierarchy of needs theory. He proposed that each individual has a 
hierarchy of 5 needs; Physiological, food, shelter and other bodily requirements at the base of the 
hierarchy and ascending through Safety, Social, Esteem to Self Actualisation Needs at the peak of 
the hierarchy. Maslow further proposed that unless the preceding, lower order need was satisfied, 
the next could not be fulfilled. The intuitive nature of this work saw wide acceptance of it in 
formulating motivation and reward frameworks, although no real empirical support for the theory 
was identified. The focus on an individual's needs led to research into the identification and 
satisfaction of human needs as a basis for managing people. 
The human centred socio-technical production system, Mathews (1994) characterised by semi-
autonomous work groups and industrial democracy principles, can be traced through the Tavistock 
institute back to human relations theorists such as McGregor (1960). The approach incorporates 
many of the attributes of the lean production system but places people in the centre of the system 
and as the source of continuous improvement. 
McGregor (1960) proposed two distinct views of human nature with respect to work. The 
assumption that employees must be coerced to work because they dislike work, are lazy and seek 
to avoid responsibility was labelled as Theory X, while Theory Y proposed that individuals can 
exercise self direction because they see work as natural, are creative and seek responsibility, 
indeed they are internally motivated with a propensity to work in a productive and creative manner. 
McGregor's distinction is in essence a cultural or ideological position, in some ways reflecting the 
differences between the scientific management, human relations and behavioural approaches. 
Interestingly there are examples where both approaches are successful. The distinction between X 
& Y characteristics is however informative in highlighting the importance of culture and values in 
framing the management and industrial relations framework. 
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Psychologist Frederick Herzberg (1957, 1982) considered the connection between satisfaction, 
motivation and productivity. Herzberg categorised a cross section of factors such as working 
conditions and other physical attributes of the workplace as hygiene factors and other factors such 
a the way work is performed, recognition and other internalised factors, analogous to Maslow's 
higher order needs, as motivating factors. The critical proposition in Herzberg's work is that the 
omission of hygiene factors while reducing dissatisfaction did not lead to satisfaction, but merely to 
lack of dissatisfaction, while lack of motivating factors will lead to a state of no satisfaction, rather 
than dissatisfaction. In many industrial awards, the historic focus was on hygiene factors rather 
than motivating factors. In light of this theory, the impact of changing hygiene factors as a means of 
increasing satisfaction and productivity is questionable. 
The recognition of motivating factors including achievement, recognition, responsibility and 
advancement as factors leading to job satisfaction is central to Emery's (1976) job characteristics 
model. As a framework for work and job design, Emery's characteristics provide a practical 
demonstration of the socio-technical approach while Herzberg's conclusions have provided a 
model for increasing maturity in management thinking and introducing a sense of realism into the 
return on investment that various initiatives may contribute. 
These theories have influenced the Australian workplace, particularly through the 1970's and 
1980's. The Australian public service and progressive private enterprises were the leader in 
introducing industrial democracy and team based models based on successful Scandinavian 
organisations through this period. However many organisations and sectors retained very 
traditional, almost master/servant organisational models. 
The preceding motivational theories focused on the job and workplace content; in other words, 
what is needed to motivate the worker. An alternate view, proposed by Robbins, Bergman & Stagg 
(1997), recognises that the infinite variation in scope, degree and priority of people's needs and 
how motivation is energised through individual and organisation processes. Termed process theory 
its three streams are goal setting, reinforcement theory and equity theory. 
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The importance of these approaches is their use in connecting contemporary management and 
industrial relations approaches through both the implementation of enterprise based agreements 
that include the development of business processes. 
Goal setting theory is based on the proposition that defining specific goals increases performance 
and challenging goals, when accepted, result in higher performance than do easier goals, Naylor & 
!Igen (1984). Reinforcement theory is based on the argument that consequences, immediately 
following behaviour, will increase the probability that behaviour will be repeated, this approach is 
particularly focused on reward for positive behaviour. The combination of these into a management 
process provides the basis for high levels of performance based on motivation aligned to 
organisations goals. These are aspects easily able to be formalised in the industrial framework. 
Equity theory reflects relativity across a number of dimensions, including the employee's calculation 
of the outcomes they receive from their job relative to the inputs they provide, and with the inputs-
outcomes of others with whom they compare themselves, and relative to employer outcomes. A 
state of equity exists if people perceive that relativities are fair. This theory, developed by Adams 
(1965), provides a framework for identifying the productivity impact associated with employees 
considering themselves to be over or under rewarded compared with others, also recognising the 
reference point for comparative analysis as a key variable. The theory suggests that both absolute 
and relative levels of reward are important in motivating workers. The theory is important when 
considering the need for management to achieve an equilibrium between marginal product and 
marginal cost (and to convince workers they are at that reward point in absolute and relative terms) 
and the role of unions in pursuing relativities between enterprises and between roles, where 
knowledge and understanding of what comprises inputs and outcomes is difficult to achieve and 
apply. 
The expectancy theory, developed by Vroom (1964) states that an individual tends to act in a 
certain way based on the expectation that the act will be followed by a given outcome and the 
perceived attractiveness of that outcome. The relationship of this theory to productivity is derived 
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from the effort — performance linkage; the perception of how much effort a certain level of 
performance will require; the performance — reward linkage and attractiveness- the value the 
individual places on the reward. The effort — performance question is one that also challenges 
employees, in particular where reward is based on time based rates of pay. This highlights the 
expectation that the time variable is an accurate proxy for effort applied by an individual. 
Goal setting theory formed the basis of management tools such as Management by Objectives 
(MBO) and integrated models such as Planning & Performance Management Systems (PPMS). 
These tools reflected an increasing focus on managing outcomes, rather than inputs. 
The work of the systems and process theorists in the development of motivational theory raises 
serious questions about the role of agents in the industrial relations framework. Such questions 
arise from concerns over the ability of unions and/or employer associations to understand the 
variation in the needs of their members and the complexity of the open system in which enterprises 
operate. The agent/principal concerns are raised in relation to the characteristics of the potential 
game theory sums able to be derived from negotiation by such agents and is particularly pertinent 
to the historic Australian industrial relations model where enterprises were bound by such 
negotiated and/or arbitrated outcomes. 
The preceding theories reflect management thinking, approaches and tools that have been 
generally applied as part of the process of introducing enterprise agreements. It is argued that the 
enterprise focus encouraged this development where the earlier centralised system did not 
encourage wide spread application of contemporary management models. 
1.3. Evolution of Australia's Industrial Relations System 
Although industrial relations has underpinned the employer/worker transaction for millennia, 
modern approaches, ideas of equity, employer/employee responsibility and the labour contract 
emerge from 18 th  century thinking. Robert Owen was a successful Scottish businessman and 
factory owner of the late 18th and early 19th centuries who was repulsed by harsh practices such as 
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the employment of young children, thirteen hour workdays and miserable working conditions. He 
chided other owners that they treated their machines better than people and while they bought the 
most expensive machines, they then bought the cheapest labour to run them. He argued labour 
was one of the best investments an owner was able to make and that, showing concern for 
employees was indeed, highly profitable. In 1825 he argued for regulated hours for all employees, 
child labour laws, public education and for other business contributions to public welfare. Many of 
his ideas formed the basis of the traditional industrial relations system and union claims. 
The history of IR in the Australian environment provides a critical context for this thesis. Industrial 
relations formed a significant policy stream within Australia, at some times responding to and at 
other times influencing complementary policy dimensions for the past century. Mathews (1994) 
characterises the policy framework within which Australia has operated as an amalgam of trade 
and industrial relations policies implemented at the time of federation and surviving to the 1980s. 
Prior to the 1860's wages were mainly set by agreement between the individual and employer, with 
reference to local benchmarks. Between 1850 and 1890 a form of collectivism to facilitate 
negotiations between employers and employees emerged. This process had little or no third party 
involvement in negotiating industrial relations issues such as terms and conditions of employment. 
Towards the latter part of the 19 th  century this system experienced long and acrimonious strike 
action, threatening the extinction of the emerging unions. In combination with the recession of the 
1890's this industrial environment led to the formation of the Australian Labour Party and interest in 
intervention mechanisms the States could use to reduce the disruption from such strike action. This 
was the point where Australia deviated from other western democracies and economies by 
introducing third party mechanisms between the employer and employee negotiations. 
While each state developed individual mechanisms, the newly developed federal constitution 
contained a clause providing the federal government with the power to make laws with respect to 
conciliation and arbitration for the prevention and settlement of industrial disputes, extending 
beyond the limits of any state. The Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 gave effect to this and led 
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to the formation of the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, a predecessor to the 
Australian Industrial Relations Commission. 
The priority for these tribunals was the development of parameters to guide the fixation of wages. 
The dominant wage fixing theme arose from the Justice Higgins' decision in what became known 
as the Harvester Case of 1907. This case related to an industrial dispute in a Victorian harvesting 
equipment manufacture plant where strike action had occurred over the failure of wages 
negotiations, which then resulted in a wage rise of 27% applied by the Court. The basis of the 
judgement was the establishment of a view as to what was a fair and reasonable living wage. This 
fair and reasonable wage was characterised as a "basic wage" for unskilled workers; above this 
basic level, margins rewarding workers who exhibited additional skills required for the job or other 
attributes meriting reward, were applied. This wage fixing system remained as the foundation of the 
Australian system until 1967. 
At the system's core was a centralist policy model, one where consideration of enterprise level 
issues was initially negligible and even in its halcyon days, was arguably limited to those 
characteristics that reflected the performance of key industries, such as those of the mines and 
metals industry. The policy was socially oriented, aimed at sustaining living standards rather than 
considering wages as an input into improved labour productivity. It inferred skilled people were 
more productive than unskilled and that time was a proxy for effort and productivity. 
The principles of Australia's rigid, inwardly looking, protectionist policies including those relating to 
industrial relations, were established soon after federation and lasted until the 1970s. 
From 1922 the basic wage was adjusted on a quarterly basis, reflecting changes in a retail price 
index, reinforcing the needs premise underpinning the approach. In 1953 the automatic adjustment 
mechanism was replaced with a capacity to pay principle and in 1956 with an annual review of the 
basic wage. 
The protectionist tariffs and living wage based industrial model was underpinned by the success of 
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specific export industries, initially agriculture, followed by the resources sectors, in particular metals 
and energy. 
The margins element of wages was fixed on two components, a work value component and a 
comparative component, Whitfield & Ross (1996). Work value components determined a monetary 
value for the requirements of workers in different jobs, in particular the nature of the work, its skills 
and responsibilities. The comparative component reflected the need to maintain relativities between 
different levels and between sectors. The balance between these elements changed over time. 
Prior to the Second World War, they tended to be evenly balanced see Dabscheck & Niland (1981). 
However between the second world war and the early 1960's the balance altered to reflect a strong 
bias toward the comparative component. 
The wages and conditions applied in the successful sectors driving the economy became 
benchmarks for other industry awards. The Metal Trades Case became the 'test case" for the 
adjustment of margins and flow-on wage increases to other sectors. The consequence of the 
margins and comparative components was adjudication on two national wage cases, one for basic 
wages and the other for margins. In 1965, these were amalgamated into one case and in 1967 the 
two part wage model was replaced with a total wage concept. This period saw attempts to 
introduce increases in work value as the basis for award increases, in reality few work value cases 
were able to break the hold of the comparative wage approach, and when an increase was granted 
in one award area it flowed on to other award areas on the claim of increased work value in similar 
jobs, Whitfield & Ross (1996). The benchmark metal trades were strongly represented within 
sectors of the economy, often the successful export sectors. Industrial relations in these sectors 
were characterised by relatively high levels of union power placing unions in the position where the 
achievement of their goals was central to maintaining market share and revenue flows. Although 
the flow-on to other industries achieved the goal of maintaining wage relativities, it made only 
limited reference to an industry's capacity to pay. This resulted in some sectors paying wages that 
resulted in those sectors being unsustainable. 
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For most of the last century, the craft based unions had been able to achieve work practices 
dominated by rigid demarcations between activities and decision making responsibility. These 
rigidities, along with other workplace conditions and allowances, significantly reduced the 
productivity of labour in comparison with its potential. As a result not only was the wage fixing 
method rigid, but the way in which employees applied themselves to tasks was also inflexible. In 
some sectors this meant enterprises had more employees than they would need if the 
demarcations were absent and that as a proportion of costs, the cost of labour was too high to be 
sustainable. The environment in which organisations attempted to introduce new management 
approaches to increase productivity was inconsistent with the rigid industrial relations rules and 
long established workplace culture. 
Not all workers were paid a minimum wage, over award payments reflected the value employers 
perceived employees made to the enterprise. These payments were made to groups and/or 
individuals. Such actions reflected an uptake of management practice in terms of incentives, 
behavioural and group theory. 
Post 1967 the validity of the centralised system was seriously questioned and the incidence of 
award by award negotiation increased significantly. This was designed to provide a circuit breaker 
to the automatic flow-on of conditions appropriate for one sector inappropriately into another. 
The Federal Arbitration Commission had attempted to limit increases, beyond those granted by the 
wage cases, by introducing stringent rules for the provision of increases. This strategy was 
designed to ensure continuity of centralised wage fixation. During the 1960's, the Federal 
Arbitration Commission had also attempted to absorb over award payments into its decisions, a 
policy leading to significant industrial unrest. 
The tensions between agents, institutions and employees during this period provide an indication of 
the difficulties in introducing changes to the industrial relations system that are at odds with the 
culture and practice of the society and the interests of many of the agents. The preceding 60 years 
of wage fixing based on social, behavioural and income needs rather than on productivity and on 
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an ethos of comparative wage justice in an income rather than productivity context saw these 
income protection and relativity principles accepted and valued by many workers and their families. 
The inflation and unemployment experienced in the late 1970's also worked against change to the 
centralised model and its indexation based wage fixing. Rapid inflation ensured pressure from 
unions and employees to maintain the real purchasing power of their incomes. The preceding ten 
years had seen a marked increase in the incidence of award increases outside the centralised 
model. This had occurred to the extent that the centralised system only contributed some 40% of 
the increase in average male wage earnings from 1969/70 to 1974/75, Hancock (1985). However, 
the increase in inflation and unemployment led to significant industrial unrest and led the 
government and the Federal Arbitration Commission to introduce wage indexation based on the 
consumer price index (CPI). From 1975 to 1981, 19 wage cases provided either a full or partial flow 
on from the index. Some of the partial increases discounted the CPI, while others provided the full 
flow on to workers up to a certain threshold and a flat rate increase for those above the threshold. 
This model, affirming the welfare approach to wage fixing was abolished in 1981, and replaced by a 
series of industry agreements. 
In the early 1980s, the need and opportunity to change this long standing model was recognised by 
the Australian Labour Party (ALP). Upon the ALP's election in 1983, Australia commenced the 
most radical change to economic, social and industrial reform experienced since Australia's 
Federation in 1901. The industrial changes were introduced alongside other reforms such as 
foreign currency market deregulation designed to open up the Australian economy. These IR 
reforms were introduced as a series of Accords, agreements between the ALP & the Australian 
Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) on a wide range of social and economic matters, Whitfield & Ross 
(1996). 
The initial accord period was characterised by a very strong centralised wage indexation system. 
This accord applied from 1983 until 1985 and was characterised by full wage indexation and no 
bargaining outside the accord process. In 1985, Accord Mk ll reflected a different policy setting; the 
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general wage increases were discounted to reflect a decline in the terms of trade in exchange for 
tax cuts, while productivity payments took the form of employer contributions to employee 
superannuation. This mix demonstrates a change in the thinking in the way industrial relations 
contributed to the policy mix. This was highlighted by inclusion of the country's relative 
competitiveness, the role of taxation in the perception and structure of real income, and the use of 
superannuation as a tool in generating wealth and providing a source of internal financing within 
the economy as considerations. 
In 1987 Accord Mk III was introduced and with it enterprise bargaining in a two tiered system. 
Specifically, the Accord provided for enterprise based productivity bargaining for the second tier of 
a two part wage increase. The first tier having been provided by the national wage case based on 
negotiation of cost offsets against proposed wage increases. Introduction of productivity 
dimensions at the enterprise level was an important break with the needs principles of the period 
prior to the accord period. This model introduced an important challenge to the Australian wages 
and industrial relations culture and the application of contemporary management alongside the 
industrial relations framework. For the first time, at a national level, there was a requirement to 
integrate the two aspects; the national wage adjustments and enterprise productivity as the basis 
for wage adjustment. 
The policy goal was to develop a nexus between productivity performance and earnings at the 
enterprise level and was motivated by the slide in Australia's comparative productivity over the 70 
years of the centralised industrial relations system. The policy was directed towards making 
efficiency gains, it did reduce labour costs and, according to Dowrick (1993), produced a once-off 
growth stimulus by introducing the notion of a Structural Efficiency Principle (SEP) into wage 
determination in Australia. The SEP identified conditions under which wage increases could be 
justified. These included a focus on improvement in work skills and increased flexibility in 
workplace practices. 
Some positive outcomes are associated with the mid 1980s reforms including strong jobs growth 
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over the period 1984-1989, a ten percent reduction in real wages in an overlapping period 1984- 
1993 and a clear diminution of hidden unemployment — see Chapman (1990). However, critics 
pointed to the negative outcomes of the period including both a slow down of productivity growth 
and substantial increases in the natural rate of unemployment. 
During 1988/89, Accords MkIVN were characterised by their lack of national wage increases. In its 
stead the productivity theme was reinforced, by allowing wage increases where it could be 
demonstrated that they were based on productivity improvement. This included an emphasis on 
award restructuring and accordance with structural efficiency principles. These principles required 
award respondents to focus on changes in work practices, working patterns or reductions in 
demarcations as a pathway to improved productivity. This accord included further wage, tax trade-
offs and increases in employer contributions to employee superannuation. This accord 
demonstrates increased sophistication in the policy applied to wages and in particular the linkages 
to other industry, taxation and general economic policy. For such policy to be effective, the 
enterprise dimension needs to work. 
The previous agreements containing no general wage rises were a major break with earlier 
centralised industrial decisions. In reasserting the centralist position, the Federal Industrial 
Commission, rejected the Accord Mk VI claim and reinforced the structural efficiency principle by 
agreeing to a general wage increase for claims compatible with the principle. The accord also 
encouraged enterprise bargaining outside the central system and provided for a flat rate rise for 
those not securing enterprise bargaining increases. The transition to enterprise bargaining was 
facilitated through the introduction of amendments to the 1988 Industrial Relations Act. Sloan 
(1993) identifies the consequences of the amendment, in changing the role of the commission to 
one of awarding pay increases to those not achieving increases through the enterprise bargaining 
process, as the catalyst for the highly centralist accord framework becoming the vehicle for the 
decentralisation of wage fixation. 
Accord Mk VI became the benchmark in industrial thinking and practice within Australia, with the 
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following two accords, operating from 1993 to 1999, characterised by no general wage increases, 
some form of mechanism for those not achieving enterprise bargaining increases and 
superannuation contributions. 
During the period 1988 to 1990 change was promoted by new policy positions was developed by 
business and the unions. The Business Council of Australia was advocating a more decentralised, 
enterprise based industrial relations model while the Federal Government established the 
Australian Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC). These changes supported the transition to 
formalised enterprise bargaining as the dominant approach to industrial relations and wage 
determination decisions. 
The reform process was given further impetus by legislative reform. Importantly the Industrial 
Relations Act 1993 resulted in the award becoming subservient to the enterprise agreement and 
the ability to negotiate an enterprise flexibility agreement without union involvement. 
During this period most states introduced complementary legislation, reinforcing the application of 
the principles to employees working under state jurisdiction. In Victoria, the state government 
transferred its industrial relations decision making to the federal jurisdiction. 
The industrial relations negotiating system within Australia had previously operated within an 
agent/principal model in which employees were represented by unions and in the centralised 
system, employers represented by employer associations. Similarly in the transition to enterprise 
agreements, employees were represented by their union, while employers often negotiated under 
guidance from employer associations. In 1997, an amendment to the Industrial Relations Act 1996, 
allowed the registration of collective agreements where the respondent was able to be either a 
union or non-union entity. The ability of employees to directly negotiate an agreement with 
employers without union involvement represented a significant change to the IR system. It 
potentially eroded the power of the union movement at a time when they were challenged in 
retaining membership. 
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The Accord agreements and changes were associated with other complementary legislative 
changes initiated at the federal and state levels during the same period. The labour Accords initially 
increased the centralised nature of wage determination, however by aligning the industrial relations 
framework with management practices, an increasingly decentralised model of industrial relations 
decision-making emerged. 
The centralised system of wage fixing and industrial relations decision making had externalised 
much of the responsibility of managers, in effect quarantining them from a considerable element of 
what was the responsibility of the overseas counterparts. In this way Australian managers had less 
incentive than many of their overseas competitors to introduce management change. As a result of 
the introduction of EBAs many of these managers were unprepared for the negotiating process and 
in designing management solutions that provided the potential improvement. The EBA period has 
been characterised by rapid organisational change through the introduction of management 
techniques over a relatively short period of time. 
1.4. Convergence of Industrial Relations and Organisational Design 
The preceding outline highlights the parallel, but in many ways disconnected development of 
industrial relations and management theory and practice within Australia. This is interesting in view 
of the management decisions that provoked the Harvester Case and where the resulting court 
decision effectively broke the nexus between industrial relations and enterprise based decisions in 
Australia for 80 years. From the 1980's onwards, the policy makers within the Australian IR system 
and managers within enterprises, faced major challenges in introducing change that was relevant 
to the dynamics of the global marketplace. 
In addition to the industrial reform, the election of the Labor Government in 1983 resulted in an 
increased focus on workforce training. A tripartite agreement, known as the Accord, between the 
government, unions and employer groups developed a national structure for the identification and 
delivery of industry based training at the state level. This training combined technical, management 
and social skills development programs. The program was the first attempt to integrate industry and 
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enterprise training and by facilitating the development of industry based skill profiles, training needs 
identification and structured delivery. The linkage between industry and enterprise strategy and skill 
development was highlighted in this period, along with new training mechanisms such as 
traineeships and competency based systems. The competency based system, in association with 
concepts of management/autonomy, were combined with classification structures based on levels 
as opposed to job titles (contributing to the reduction of demarcation problems) as part of the award 
restructuring initiatives of the early 1990s. An important aspect of the new classification structure 
was the deepening of the concept of management to include individual and group self management 
in addition to it being a concept solely focused on the management of subordinates. The tripartite 
industry model was replaced by an enterprise level system based on the training guarantee model 
where employers were required to spend a fixed proportion of company revenue on training. 
The 1980's were also characterised by major change in Australia, driven by social and economic 
policy reform and the integration of the economy into the global model through reductions in tariffs 
and international agreements. This period also saw the momentum for the convergence of 
industrial relations with management into a comprehensive enterprise management system 
increase. The industrial and training policy mix provided the framework for an integration of 
strategy, organisation design and the industrial relations system into an enterprise management 
framework. This integrated policy framework overlayed a strong and extensive institutional 
framework, where the centralist, institutional model could be construed as the constraint to that 
convergence. 
However, as with many institutional approaches, interests were represented by agents; including 
legal advocates, industrial relations specialists, employee and employer representatives. The 
changes were at times a threat to these players and their specific goals. These agents have 
specific and powerful roles within the system. Agents can make the system efficient and effective. 
Equally, it is argued that agents can at times also work to ensure perpetuity of an inefficient system. 
This scenario reflects the problems associated with the agent, principal framework as a truly 
representative framework, free of distortions and open to improvement in the interest of the key 
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parties. Dunlop (1957) viewed the industrial relations system as being comprised of 
"certain actors, certain contexts and an ideology which binds the 	system 
together". 
This statement is considered important in that it introduces other variables associated with agent 
based organisations and structures, in particular it introduces ideology into the system in an 
institutional way, as opposed to the differences between the people centred and technical 
approaches outlined in the previous section. Dunlop reinforces systems thinking as a way of 
considering the industrial relations framework. This approach was further developed by Kochan, 
Katz and McKersie (1986). It is useful in representing the manner in which industrial relations have 
been integrated into enterprises and how industrial relations and management/organisation design 
had converged. The framework represents both the focus of the players and the relationships 
between them. 
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Table 1.1 Kochan, Katz and McKersie Institutional Framework 
The policy reform of the 1980's created the environment that enabled this integration in a manner 
not possible for the previous 70 years. In particular the framework highlights the link between 
business strategy and management through the collective bargaining process a factor absent in 
many enterprises until this time. 
The collective bargaining model, applied through an enterprise rather than industry or economy 
wide approach, has enabled enterprises to integrate these elements into the negotiation process. 
Business strategy is arguably a function of product/service mix and attributes, market positioning 
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and the delivery model. Some firms produce physical outputs, ranging from commodities to 
sophisticated durable products; others derive a margin from transactions and others provide a 
direct service. Each of these sectors operates in a markedly different business environment. While 
managers will perform similar roles, the variation in business models and approaches to achieving 
some competitive advantage results in them applying enterprise specific techniques to the activities 
presented in the employer column. This variation reinforces the risk of using an agent/principal 
approach in attempting to achieve an optimum outcome for the enterprise. 
The capacity to integrate business strategy considerations in negotiations is arguably affected by 
the degree to which negotiations include and are influenced by, agents such as unions. The 
traditional negotiating role of unions is challenged by the transition from a predominantly input and 
control focus within both enterprise management and industrial relations practice, to a model that 
includes concepts such as outputs and commitment as the dominant framework for negotiation of 
not only wages and conditions but organisational change initiatives within an enterprise. 
The development and negotiation of an enterprise agreement has provided employers and 
employees with the opportunity and incentive to introduce improved management models, develop 
employer/employee relationships based on common ground and establish industrial relations 
approaches that balance productivity improvement and wage outcomes. As with most new 
initiatives it has taken employers and employees some time to learn how to adapt to this 
decentralised environment. In essence it is the focus of the agreements, the manner in which the 
agreements are negotiated and the scope of issues included that lead to improvements in 
productivity. 
The decentralisation of industrial relations decision making has occurred within the context of broad 
policy and practice transition. The next chapter reviews evidence of this convergence, some 
evidence of the impact and issues arising from the changes before proceeding to analyse the 
impacts of formal Enterprise Bargaining Agreements (EBAs) on labour productivity and wage 
earnings. 
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CHAPTER TWO - THE TRANSITION TO THE 
DECENTRALISED INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SYSTEM - 
EVIDENCE, ISSUES AND IMPACTS 
2.1. Introduction 
The introduction of the Structural Efficiency Principle (SEP) was the catalyst for many 
organisations to reconsider their involvement in industrial relations activities and as a result, 
their approach to industrial relations (IR) reform. Prior to this principle being implemented, 
the external, centralised nature of industrial relations decision making had resulted in firms 
and their employees accepting the associated IR and wage benchmarks as the natural order 
of things. 
Australia's highly centralised industrial relations structure left many firms and their 
employees with no real knowledge of what could be achieved from different modes of 
thinking about IR issues and with little experience in negotiating options that could be 
advantageous to the firm and employees. As a result, most early initiatives flowing from the 
SEP were limited to negotiating trade-offs between working conditions and wage increases 
as a strategy for reducing inefficiencies and gaining increased productivity. 
For more strategically oriented and experienced firms, organisational development initiatives 
designed to improve the quantity and/or quality of labour's contribution to business 
performance, were negotiated as SEP implementation strategies. While both dimensions 
were aimed at improving productivity, each reflects significantly different management 
approaches, consequently naïve firms achieved some one off improvements, while the 
astute firms established a management framework that supported continuous improvement. 
The SEP facilitated this development by providing a linkage between organisational 
development practices, management and the industrial relations framework. These 
established the culture for later enterprise based organisational improvements. In their early 
manifestations, enterprise bargaining initiatives did not necessarily demonstrate significant 
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organisational change and had limited impact outside the parameters set by Awards. The 
enterprise bargaining contribution to wage setting and work practice reform depended upon 
the interaction between awards and bargaining outcomes in individual workplaces. Hawke 
and Wooden (1998) provide some evidence of this interdependency, suggesting that in the 
early days of reform the majority of enterprise bargaining agreements were read in 
conjunction with relevant Awards. Further, Edwards (1999) indicates that early enterprise 
bargaining typically took the form of productivity agreements and often involved trade-off's or 
merely agreement between the parties on the importance of improving productivity. As 
awards were reduced in scope to core conditions, the effective scope of bargaining at the 
enterprise level, broadened. 
This broadening of the scope of enterprise agreements resulted in the relocation and 
modification of factors previously subject to award conditions, modified to suit the enterprise 
and included in EBAs. As a method of formalising organisational change, many 
organisations included strategically oriented workplace reform initiatives within the scope of 
EBAs. These strategic reform initiatives focused on both improvements in market 
performance and in productivity. Included in this mix were monetary and non-monetary 
reward mechanisms designed to motivate reform. 
In Section 2.2 of this chapter the evidence of changes resulting from decentralising the 
industrial relations system and issues surrounding the introduction of the change are 
considered. Section 2.3 contains an analysis of institutional and structural change occurring 
within the business environment and explores the consequences. Section 2.4 examines 
evidence of the impact of enterprise bargaining on productivity, while Section 2.5 includes a 
review of their impact on wages. Productivity and wage effects are key labour market 
outcomes impacted by the IR reform and are the focus of later chapters. 
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2.2. Examples and Evidence of Change within Enterprises and 
Institutions 
2.2.1. The Enterprise Level 
The first measure of the success of any policy is the level and speed of its uptake, followed 
by understanding of its implementation and effectiveness. 
Measurement of the uptake of agreements provides an indication of the primary 
effectiveness of IR decentralisation policy at the enterprise level. In this thesis collective 
agreements registered in the federal jurisdiction provide the sample used to reflect uptake. 
This sample has been utilised as the basis for research because of the robust and 
consistent nature of the federal collection and the comprehensive definition of agreements. 
Collective agreements, which are enterprise agreements made between the employer and 
the employee union, have been registered in the federal industrial relations jurisdiction since 
1992. The data set is comprised of agreements registered in the jurisdiction, its form, 
industry sector and number of employees covered by it. As agreements are made for a 
predetermined period, beyond the first two to three years the data set includes replacement 
agreements. As a result this measure provides an indication of the level of bargaining 
activity within the sector, where the term coverage is used throughout the thesis it refers to 
coverage by agreements established during the period, an indicator of agreement making 
activity and influence represented by the proportion of industry or sector employees 
involved. 
The agreements have been categorised by the Department of Employment and Workplace 
Relations (DEWR) in the following manner: 
• All agreements — the total number of agreements certified; 
• Productivity agreements — agreements with a focus on achieving productivity gains; 
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• Wage agreements — all agreements that contain wage provisions. This classification 
excludes agreements containing only conditions of employment; 
• Quantifiable wage agreements — a subset of wage agreements where annual 
percentage wage increases are quantified. 
• Comprehensive wage agreements — agreements containing a comprehensive scope of 
bargaining elements. 
The definitions reflect a progression in the complexity of issues included in the agreement 
and potential to improve productivity. 
Industry sectors have been categorised as output, margin and service sectors in line with the 
framework outlined in Chapter 1. 
The all agreements category also includes agreements using various mechanisms to 
calculate wage increases as the agreement progresses through time, in particular, those 
agreements including productivity and pay conditions and those applying independently of 
any award. 
Figure 2.1. Incidence of Agreements by Agreement Characteristics 
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Figure 2.1. shows the growth in federally registered collective agreements from 1992 to 
2003, the sample comprises both new and replacement agreements. While there is a growth 
in all agreement types, the period is dominated by the wage agreements. The three year 
cyclical pattern emerging post 1997 may reflect the common agreement duration and their 
subsequent replacement, when added to newly negotiated agreements, the combination 
results in the step increase evident in 2001. 
The most common form of the agreement is the wage agreement; these include those with 
general wage clauses and the most rapidly growing form, those specifying the quantum of 
wage increases. From 1994 onwards there has been a consistent growth in agreements with 
a productivity focus and more latterly including agreements that include a broad scope of 
conditions and business initiatives, the comprehensive agreement. These trends reflect a 
transition to a more performance centred and improvement focused approach than is 
inherent in the wage agreements, which are often read in conjunction with parent awards. 
The profile in Figure 2.1 provides some evidence that a small, but significant number of 
enterprises have used the decentralised system to integrate the industrial relations 
framework into their specific business model. 
Figure 2.2. below demonstrates the growth in the number of people covered by agreements 
certified each year by sector. At the beginning of the bargaining era industry sector take up 
occurred on a relatively equal basis. Since the mid 1990's, growth in the incidence of EBAs 
introduced annually has been largely derived from the service sector and to a lesser degree 
from the margin sector. This reflects both the early uptake within the production/resources 
sector and the growth of the service and margin sectors. 
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Figure 2.2. Number of Employees by Sector Covered by Agreement Signed Per Annum 
The characteristics demonstrated in the above agreement profile indicate that there has 
been a significant uptake of enterprise based bargaining across each sector. Figure 2.1, 
reflects the dominance of wage agreements. A significant bias towards wage agreements 
rather than productivity or comprehensive agreements can be argued to reflect the both 
interest in wages during introductory period and the challenge to enterprises in moving to 
more comprehensive use of industrial relations as an organisational development strategy. 
The transition has not been an easy process for many enterprises. The decentralisation of 
wage and condition decisions has challenged enterprise managers and the relationships 
between employers and employees. In the centralised system managers and employees 
were both unaccustomed to such wide and complex negotiations and as a result, the 
relationships between unions and employers have been realigned to reflect the change in 
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the scope of issues included in negotiations. In many instances employees were introduced 
to business factors and the business implications of claims for the first time. The initial result 
of this new industrial environment was a learning period where agreements to merely agree 
that change should occur and agreements to pay for future change became the common 
themes. The implication of this was little initial progress in aligning wages and conditions to 
the business enterprise environment. 
Decentralisation policy was designed to accelerate the transition in wage setting decision 
criteria from cost of living adjustments through a productivity trade-off phase to performance 
based wage increases. At the enterprise level, interest in the absolute level of wages, their 
relativity with other employers and growth in wage earnings is based on both their impact on 
cost and the ability to retain, motivate and attract employees. Consideration of cost and 
productivity trade-offs within the context of the labour market is central to the negotiation of 
industrial agreements. Enterprise agreements are made in recognition of the enterprises 
market position and of its supply and demand characteristics. In addition to the consideration 
of wages as an input cost, their role as a motivating factor is arguably critical to long run 
sustainability and productivity. 
While wage agreements are enterprise based, they are made in recognition of the 
characteristics of both the product/service provided and of the conditions in associated 
consumer and labour markets. 
A key objective of a decentralised industrial relations system was to achieve a wage 
earnings structure aligned to enterprise strategy and capacity to pay, subject to externally 
determined minimum standards, rather than economy wide wage increases based on cost of 
living adjustments, or the capacity of a few well performing industry sector's capacity to pay. 
The capacity for managers to align business strategy, performance and wages is considered 
a precondition to business and industry success. 
Matthews (1994) argues that enterprises operating close to best practice approach change 
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in a different way to those remaining with traditional production models. He also argues that 
enterprises generally make limited strategic choices, responding only to the immediate 
market state and technological options obvious to them. Matthews observes that those 
enterprises introducing change, such as IR reform, on a reactive or coercive basis, 
compared with those who are considering the future and basing change on the optimal 
means of achieving strategic goals, approach change in fundamentally different ways. This 
mirrors the earlier Dunphy & Stace (1990) finding. 
Matthews (1994) utilises case studies to demonstrate the manner in which enterprises 
implement enterprise bargaining. The most effective achieve significant transformation by 
integrating contemporary human relations, management and industrial relations approaches. 
Individual companies have adopted differing approaches reflecting their market and 
business environment. ConZinc Rio Tinto (CRA) for example, adopted a unitarist approach 
to reform, seeking to place all employees on individual contracts and, according to Hearn & 
McKinnon (1996) restricting the bargaining activities of trade unions. Other enterprises have 
adopted a more collaborative approach with trade unions. 
Successful change models were adopted by other organisations. There was a particular 
focus on using the EBA process to enable enterprises to adopt socio-technical approaches 
to align structures, processes and people to organisational goals and productivity 
improvement initiatives. A summary of these cases follows, and are used to demonstrate the 
convergence of industrial relations and management principles and practice by utilising EBA 
negotiation as an enabling tool and contract to formalise the change. 
Matthews (1994) argues that success in the following cases is based on the sense of 
strategic purpose, collaboration and the coincidental implementation of new technology and 
social change. This complete transformation model contrasts with approaches attempting to 
overlay an existing technology with a new social system or to implement new technology into 
42 
a social system reflecting the firms existing business model. 
Matthews' cross section of case studies highlights the role of enterprise bargains as the 
contract to bind the parties to a plan of action designed to achieve a particular result, as well 
as to detail conditions of employment and the reward framework. This is a major deviation 
from the focus on conditions of employment, classification and wage scales within the 
centralised award model that focused on inputs. The case studies examined by Matthews 
include Bendix Mintex, Ford Plastics, CIG Gas Cylinders, Colonial Mutual and the Australian 
Tax Office. 
Bendix Mintex commenced introduction of cellular manufacturing into its automotive brakes 
plant in 1992. This strategy combined the introduction of new technology and cellular plant 
layout. Previously the plant had been organised as a linear workflow. In the new model each 
cell of people was responsible for the production of a whole product, responsibility for 
production was internalised within the team, rather than externalised in a supervisor role. 
The whole product focus contrasted with the task orientation of jobs within the previous 
linear flow model. Introduction of the cell structure, new technology and social change 
facilitated the other manufacturing techniques such as just in time inventory management 
and smaller batch sizes that reduced the stock and finished goods holdings. By combining 
these initiatives with workflow and quality improvements, Matthews (1994) identifies that 
Bendix Mintex achieved a 20% improvement in overall plant productivity. 
Introduction of these team based work design models was not limited to plants producing 
physical outputs. Colonial Mutual introduced a client centred system in which the team was 
responsible to meet the total service and administrative needs of a specific group of 
customers. This again contrasted with the previous model where people or groups were 
responsible for a part of the process, for example, changing the clients contact details in the 
firm's record system. The new model treated the customer as having a number of 
interrelated needs, capable of being addressed by a single multi-disciplinary team. The 
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organisational transformation significantly reduced query and contact turn around times and 
improved performance. Teams were rewarded with a bonus if they met a mix of profit, 
customer satisfaction and process improvement indicators. 
At Ford Plastics, the strategic choice was the introduction of a quality assurance model and 
focus on process intent, the achievement of the necessary standards inherent in the 
process. This initiative included job redesign that reintegrated tasks previously treated as 
separate, this enlarged the scope of jobs, increased responsibility and combined separate 
jobs into teams with authority and accountability for production and quality. This combination 
of changes is consistent with Emery's (1976) job characteristics model. The initiative was 
developed as a particular compliance strategy during negotiations associated with the 
implementation of the 1989 structural efficiency principle requirements, in response to the 
identification of teamwork as a specific concern within the organisation. The subsequent 
enterprise agreement supported implementation of the strategy and also reinforced an 
increased focus on training. 
CIG Gas Cylinders initiated comprehensive organisational reform. This was supported by 
team based performance pay and gainsharing calculated on reductions in benchmark costs 
identifiable as being subject to team control. The model and implementation tools were 
developed with the cooperation of the workforce. In implementing the strategy, teams 
applied quality control, value management and continuous improvement techniques at each 
step in the production process. Successful implementation reduced turn-around times by 
400% and stock holdings by 300%. This improvement enabled the firm to achieve long term 
customer contracts. The wage system was changed to an annualised salary model, 
augmented with team performance bonuses, a significant change from the earlier hourly rate 
with the associated penalty rate model. This approach broke the long established use of the 
time equals effort and output proxy. 
The public sector also pursued vigorous reform. The Australian Taxation Office negotiated a 
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long-term agreement to introduce electronic lodgement technology over a period of 5 years 
with the goal of improving its processing efficiency as a strategy to control costs. This 
technological change progressed in conjunction with significant negotiation and staff 
involvement in workchange programs. 
These examples reflect approaches typical in large scale organisations, those prepared and 
able to make significant investment in organisational change to protect their market position 
and/or to achieve a strategic advantage from such investment. The resulting management 
flexibility and innovation and capacity to invest is not reflected in all Australian business. 
However the evident transformation of large organisation was also mirrored in a cross 
section of small to medium sized enterprises. Conformity with structural efficiency principles, 
the introduction of award restructuring and increasing competition meant many organisations 
were seeking reform to compete more effectively in the market, by reducing costs and 
providing improved value. The adoption of associated processes and initiatives was 
promoted through government support programs. 
Barrett & Mutabazi (1996) demonstrate some typical organisational responses to the 
opportunity for reform in a case study of changes at Billingbrook College. This example 
typifies the approach to introducing change in many organisations through the mid 1990s in 
terms of both the scope of improvement sought, the process and motivators used to 
implement such changes as well as the difficulty of making the transition in a small 
organisation. The college's certified agreement was developed through an enterprise 
bargaining process designed to involve staff in organisational change required to move the 
college from what was perceived as a teacher focused culture to that of a student focused 
one. The process and agreement were used to formalise outcomes of the organisational 
change process and to legitimise a number of associated issues. Barrett & Mutabazi (1996) 
observed that organisational change at Billingbrook College was developed and 
implemented as an ongoing process based on enterprise bargaining to formalise outcomes 
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and to provide issues associated with change a legitimacy they would be otherwise denied. 
The above case studies demonstrate that enterprise agreements are neither limited in scope 
nor homogenous in nature. They are an enabling mechanism, taking the form of a contract 
between the employer and employees to confirm an agreement as simple as a pay scale or 
reward framework or as comprehensive as a major, strategic organisational change program 
inclusive of time frames; structures; processes; decision criteria and reward mechanisms. 
The critical point is that enterprise agreements are not merely an enterprise level version of 
an award, they may be complementary to an industry award, may replace an award and be 
much more comprehensive and targeted in outcomes sought than an industry award. 
Importantly they are renegotiated frequently, ensuring managers and employees have an 
ongoing focus on both productivity and wage returns. 
Case studies provide examples of specific instances where there is evidence of congruency 
between organisational design and industrial relations. Much evidence indicates that 
organisational design and industrial relations approaches and practices have been used in 
an integrated and complementary manner to improve alignment between the organisation's 
goals and employee's focus and effort. How representative are these case studies? 
The National Institute of Labour Studies, NILS (1998) Workplace Management Survey 
provides a qualitative and more representative view, than the case studies, of whether the 
changes in management practice are widespread. Wooden & Drago (2000) cite the results 
of the survey of a representative sample of approximately 220 businesses each employing 
more than 20 people where a collective agreement was in place. The survey reflected 
manager's perceptions of workplace differences between 1995 and 1998 in relation to 
profitability; labour productivity; output quality; employee skills levels; management 
employee relations and their ability to introduce change. The results are summarised as 
follows. 
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Management — employee relations 
Labour Productivity 
Employee Skill Levels 
Profitability 
1 Output Quality 
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PERFORMANCE INDICATOR 	% Perceiving Positive Results % Perceiving No Change 1 
Ability to introduce change 66 	 29 
Table 2.1. Managers Perceptions of Key Business Performance Indicators 
Source NILS 1988 
The results provide an indication of the value attributed to the impact of introducing collective 
agreements into the workplace on a number of business variables. The positive results for 
the firm's ability to introduce change and the state of workplace relations tend to indicate 
changes in process within the enterprise. This impact, in conjunction with improvement in 
input skills, (a matter outside most industry awards except as a mechanism around which to 
determine wage differentials) sits alongside the perception of improved labour productivity 
and to some degree profitability. Profitability, affected by both revenue and expenditure 
performance, is the least controllable of the variables tested in the NILS (1998) survey. It is 
subject to market conditions, fixed cost structures and a range of influences that reflect 
external market factors, interest rates and other fixed costs established in earlier periods. 
Output quality was the only indicator where the perception of no change outweighed the 
perception of improvement. 
These results provide an indication of manager's increased satisfaction over this time period 
from the introduction of enterprise agreements. Wooden & Drago find that in the 1998 NILS 
study 71% of managers expressed satisfaction with how the enterprise agreements were 
working with only 12% indicating dissatisfaction. 
While enterprises and their employees were progressing through a period of learning about 
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change, significant structural change was also occurring in the institutional environment as 
well, in particular in the structure and role of the union movement, the labour market and in 
the economy overall. These factors further reinforce the need for change at the enterprise 
level. 
2.3. Institutional and Structural Change and Background to 
Enterprise Bargaining 
2.3.1. Unions 
The approach taken to industrial relations and the perception of the role and value of unions 
is at times based on belief and ideology rather than evidence. Crockett, Dawkins, Miller & 
Mulvey (1992) find that the incidence of unionisation on site was associated with lower 
relative productivity, however they also conclude that the reduction in the number of unions 
may have diminished this union effect. Union's collective voice has been influential in 
determining the parameters of Australia's industrial relations system. An example of this 
influence is demonstrated by their role in influencing the underpinning philosophy and wage 
fixing decision criteria and then using these parameters to extend the capacity to pay within 
successful industries to the remainder. This combination of influence and negotiation criteria 
contributed to the absence of a nexus between labour productivity and wage rates for most 
of the 20 th century in Australia. 
However since the 1970's union membership levels have declined to the extent that from 
1976 to 1996, union density, measured as the proportion of employees who are union 
members, fell from 51.2 % to 31.1% of the workforce (ABS 6325.0). Griffen and Svensen 
(1996) argue the decline has a complex set of causes. One significant explanation is derived 
from changes in the nature of the Australian economy. During the 1980's much of the 
economy's employment growth occurred in industries characterised by low union 
membership, the change in structure contributing to approximately 1/3 of decline in 
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membership density, Peetz (1990). The remainder of the decline results from people's 
reduced propensity to join unions. A number of factors are identified as contributors to not to 
join or to leave decisions; these include the decline of real wages in the 1990's and 
increased unemployment, together with the ability to enjoy wage increases without 
necessarily being a union member. 
Figure 2.3. Union Membership by Sector 
Since 1990 the reduction in membership has accelerated. Kenyon & Lewis (1996) and 
Pocock (1996) speculate that the transition to fewer, larger unions has contributed to this 
trend along with the decline of the closed shop model that had dominated sectors such as 
the manufacturing, building and minerals sectors. In the closed shop model, union 
membership was a prerequisite to gaining employment. 
There was significant difference in union membership levels between the private and public 
sector workforces. In the private sector, the membership level was 24% of the workforce, 
while in the public sector it was 55.4% of the workforce. Part of the decline is attributed to 
the nature of the industrial relations system where union and non union members both 
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receive the benefits of flow-ons from national wage decisions regardless of membership. 
Kenyon & Lewis (1996) and Pocock (1996) speculate that the move from craft based to 
industry based unions has contributed to the decline in union membership, the trend having 
occurred in a period where the growth of enterprise bargaining requires less rather than 
more decentralisation in complementary institutions. During the 1990's, while the IR system 
was decentralising, the union movement was experiencing a period of increasing 
concentration. There was significant amalgamation of craft and sector based unions, 
concentrating them into major industry based unions. 
Dowrick (1993) used simultaneous bargaining games to evaluate the wage effects of 
different industrial relations systems. Based on early experiences of enterprise bargaining, 
Dowrick found that union structures exert strongest wage pressure when unions are 
organised on craft lines at industry level and predicted that the abandonment of centralised 
bargaining and the splintering of employer/employee organisations into craft and industry 
units would produce greater wage pressure and wage inequality. 
The involvement of such large scale employee organisations in negotiating enterprise level 
agreements leads to questions of the degree to which the interests of the industry based 
organisations coincide with the interests of employees within a small to medium sized 
enterprise. This concern is central to consideration of the agent/principal model. During the 
period that enterprise wages and conditions were set centrally to industry or on national 
benchmarks, enterprises worked within these standards. The involvement of a highly 
concentrated union structure, with centrally established policies, in an enterprise level 
agreement has the capacity to restrict the ability of players at the enterprise level to pursue 
their own best interests. The potential for the union, as the key bargaining agent leads to 
questions about how well the agreement's parameters reflect the specific needs of the 
employees represented. 
That different agreements reflect similar or identical issues and rates of increase raises 
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concerns in relation to pattern bargaining. Pattern Bargaining occurs when unions are able 
to negotiate agreements reflecting similar conditions and payments across a range of 
enterprises. The effect of pattern bargaining on wages and conditions tends to be analogous 
to the result that could be expected from sector based award negotiation. Consequently the 
results may not be in the best interests of the employees of the specific enterprise. Wooden 
(1999) cites simultaneous conclusion dates for enterprise agreements across a wide range 
of enterprises as evidence of centralised collectivism in pattern bargaining. The implication 
of Woodens' finding is that union negotiated collective agreements are to some extent less 
focused on the interests of employees and more on the union's own agenda. Wooden 
(2000) perceives the correlation between the incidence of non-union agreements, low levels 
of union membership and the absence of formal registration as demonstrating an increased 
propensity for decentralisation and the value that both employees and employers place on 
such non agent based approaches as a means of them achieving their respective goals.. 
Must the level of union membership be above a minimum threshold for the union to be 
viewed as a valid, representative organisation and is the proportion of employee 
membership an appropriate proxy for union influence? The fact that unions are signatories to 
the agreement is of greater interest than the level of membership per se. Some employers 
prefer the option of negotiating with a union representative, skilled in negotiation and 
experienced in the process rather than directly negotiating with a representative group of 
employees who may lack these skills and knowledge. 
Members of the institutional school view union membership as an appropriate measure of 
union influence. They perceive unions as influential, providing a collective, often positive, 
voice in contributing to both productivity and wages. If this is so, it will continue to place 
unions in influential positions, indeed it was not until 1996 that agreements were able to be 
negotiated without union involvement. Interestingly, there are very few examples of 
registered agreements that did not include union involvement in their development. In 
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response to this, Wooden (2001) argues that union membership is not a proxy for their level 
of activity and scale of influence. 
There are direct benefits for an enterprise in dealing with a bargaining agent. The enterprise 
faces a transaction cost when negotiating agreements. As identified above the transaction 
cost and the benefit/cost of the negotiation within the agreement period may have more 
positive outcomes if it involves a mature negotiating entity in comparison with inexperienced 
employee representatives. 
Uncertainty is inherently present in the negotiation process. Not only is the future of the 
enterprise uncertain, there is also imperfect information. It can be argued that managers 
have higher quality information in relation to the business and market environment, than do 
employees or other agents. This information and the employer/employee relationship can 
translate into an imbalance in the distribution of power involving negotiations between 
employers and employees. 
Norris (1997) also identifies a potential union impact on productivity. From Freeman and 
Medoff (1986), Norris argues unions may, on balance, have a positive effect on labour 
productivity arising from the voice response. This argument is based on options available to 
employee in the face of dissatisfaction with some aspect of their employment. These options 
are identified as exit or voice responses. The exit response is to quit the job while the voice 
response is the ability to complain. The voice response is more likely to occur in unionised 
employment than non-unionised employment. Unions provide a collective voice to redress a 
range of issues, some of which are contributors to improved efficiency and productivity. 
Miller & Mulvey (1991) conclude that the collective voice response reduces workplace 
concerns and results in reduced employee turnover in these workplaces. According to 
Norris (1997), an added advantage of such stable workplaces is an increased likelihood of 
training, a contributor to increased productivity. 
Noriss (1997) summarises the potential impact of unions on relative wages. He argues that 
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unions have a goal of increasing the wages of their members by exerting market power and 
while it does not follow that union members will earn more than non members, unions can 
affect wages in a number of ways. If union negotiated wage increases lead to redundancies 
and those displaced workers seek employment in sectors where crowding out has 
depressed wages in that sector, the net effect of the union activity is to reduce wages. 
Equally unions can have a positive effect on wages. As identified above, the union has a 
central role in negotiating national wage increases, and while this has tended to include 
minimum conditions, employers of non union labour may pay a union rate to ensure that the 
enterprise is not unionised. This is termed the union threat effect. 
The existence of a union wage premium has been widely studied. While the studies are 
inconclusive as to the presence of a premium, it can be argued that penalty rates provide a 
mark up in unionised wages and that there is correlation between large enterprises, 
unionisation and higher wages. This relationship is potentially related to the following 
discussion on inter industry wage differentials, particularly if the industry sector is 
characterised by large firms, for example the mineral and metal manufacturing sector, or the 
petroleum sector. 
The analysis of US wage differentials by Hellerstein, Neumark & Troske (1999) and of those 
within the UK economy by Booth and Frank (1999) both conclude that wage differentials 
match productivity differentials in the sampled firms. The wage premia in those studies 
represent performance based pay in the US and UK economies, but are instantiated as 
over-award payment regimes in Australia. 
The influence of the union movement on the manner in which enterprises approach the 
process of developing the scope of enterprise agreements is ambiguous. There is evidence 
of both benefits and costs for the employer and employees in terms of both productivity and 
wages from union participation. 
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2.3.2. Changes to the Labour Market 
While enterprises, unions and the industrial relations system were undergoing major change, 
the labour market itself was radically altering in profile. Some of this was a result of the 
organisational and industrial factors in play at the time, changes to patterns of trade and 
consumption and changing values and characteristics of the labour supply. The introduction 
of lean production systems to reduce costs as a means of achieving international 
competitiveness has resulted in significant restructuring and downsizing in large scale 
manufacturing. The high fixed costs associated with permanent workforces comprising 
operational, specialist and administrative personnel were reduced through redundancy 
programs that reduced employment to core production requirements. In many instances the 
previously employed specialists became sub-contractors to their previous employers, in 
effect becoming a variable cost to the enterprise. The benefit of this was that these 
specialities then became available to the broader business community, increasing their 
capacity and productivity. Similarly the public sector shed many thousands of permanent, full 
time positions, increasing the level of outsourcing in provision of support and technical 
services. 
The growth in the service and margins sectors, and the market demand for access to 
products and services outside previously normal business hours resulted in the growth of 
new forms of work. These included an increase in the incidence of part-time work, in many 
instances in conjunction with a short and split span of hours and coverage over weekends. 
Differences in the employment patterns between sectors are highlighted below. Employees 
are categorised as either full time or part time, with part time including both those who work 
less than full time hours and those employed on a casual, as needed basis. There has been 
a significant and continuing increase in the incidence of part-time employment. 
As highlighted in Figure 2.4. the production/resources sector has maintained both its 
employment level, albeit subject to a cyclical pattern and the general full time to part time 
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ratio of its employment profile over the study period. Contractors are not included in the 
profile. This is of significance because of the high level of outsourcing characterising the 
agriculture, forestry or manufacturing industries for example. The labour resource used by 
an enterprise is often significantly greater than those on an employee payroll, this is 
particularly evident in the output sectors but increasingly a characteristic of other sectors as 
well. 
Figure 2.4. Production/RESOURCES Sector Employment Profile 
The strong, consistent employment growth of the Australian services sector is identified 
below in Figure 2.5. While there has been growth in full time employment, part time 
employment has grown at a greater rate, resulting in a slight increase in the ratio of part time 
to full time employees in this sector. The scope of hours and periods of peak customer 
demand (both during the day and from a seasonal perspective) have generated the use of 
part time employment mechanisms to control input costs by both reducing hours worked and 
eliminating the significant penalty rates that have historically applied to overtime work. 
The change in the ratio of full to part time employment has raised some concerns amongst 
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workers in relation to relative power in negotiations, the argument being that part-time 
employees are less able to participate in negotiations. Concern flows on to perceptions of 
gender inequity in wages. The inference is premised on the higher representation of female 
employees in the services sector and in part time roles. It is also recognised that part time 
employment allows some segments of the labour market to access employment that suits 
their personal circumstances. 
Number ol Fun/Part rune  Employees (000) by Senices Sector 
I'll 
11111111 11 111 
I I I I I I I I I I III 
I I I I I I I I I I I I I 
0 
Figure 2.5. Employment Profile Services Sector 
The margins sector has an employment profile that reflects mixed characteristics. There is 
both an overall growth of employment and a cyclical pattern similar to the production sector 
but with a constant level of full time employment. Employment growth in the sector is 
dominated by part time employment. This may be a function of the use by firms of part time 
employees to cover increased market demand and to simultaneously reduce the fixed cost 
and risk associated with the cost of full time employment. 
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Figure 2.6. Employment Profile Margins Sector 
2.4. Productivity 
In Chapter One the export sector's contribution to the Australian economy and the country's 
relatively high standard of living is identified as being a significant one. This was based on 
agricultural exports in the early twentieth century and in the post war period, the minerals 
sector. The income derived from these export sectors is central to the performance of 
internally focused sectors of the economy and wage structures formulated in the centralised 
model. For this reason it is argued that the centrally based wage structures underpin 
Australia's standard of living until the 1990's. 
The economy, while export dependent, was still relatively closed in comparison with its' 
current status. The fundamental problem facing the Australian economy in the early 1990's 
is crystalised when the relative productivity of the Australian economy is compared with 
trading parties and other similar mature economies. Its 1990 position is summarised in Table 
2.2. 
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Industry Sector United States 
100 
100 
Australia Other G7 
(a) 
Agriculture 54 37 
Mining 95 45 
Manufacturing 100 66 73 
Electricity, Gas & Water 100 54 80 
Construction 100 86 88 
L[ Wholesale & Retail Trade 100 
100 
75 80 








Table 2.2. Relative Labour Productivity (Index) by Selected Industries (1990): International 
Comparisons (US = 100) 
Source: Industry Commission (1997) 
Note: (a) Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the UK 
Reproduced from Wooden (2000) 
The Australian economy's relatively low productivity performance in many sectors is 
indicated in Table 2.2. It highlights both the importance of productivity and the need to 
improve it, thus allowing Australia to compete internationally and to maintain its standard of 
living. From Table 2.2., Australia lagged a long way behind the United States in all sectors 
apart from mining. In comparison with the G7 countries, Australia is more productive in only 
Agriculture and Transport/Communications and lagged significantly in Electricity, Gas and 
Water and to a lesser degree, manufacturing. When compared with other small OECD 
countries, Australia tends to reflect similar patterns and levels of productivity The exception 
is Electricity, Gas and Water, where Australia, at that time was significantly less productive. 
Wooden (2000), highlights the potential for productivity improvement as a basis for closing 
the gap between current performance and best practice. In 1990, Australia had much 
potential for improvement. Dowrick (1993) analyses the impact of employee bargaining 
structures on productivity. This analysis, for the period 1960 to 1989, concludes that 
economies with either highly centralised or highly decentralised bargaining structures 
experienced the highest incidence of total factor productivity growth over the period, while 
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those with highly decentralised structures performed slightly better than those with highly 
centralised systems. Dowrick's analysis coincides with the starting point of Australia's 
industrial relations system transition to increasing decentralisation. 
In 2000, the Australian Productivity Commission examined issues surrounding the 
productivity of the Australian economy. The analysis identified a significant increase in 
labour productivity growth from 1990/91 onwards when compared with the period from 
1964/65 until that time. The commission plotted labour productivity (measured in output per 
labour hour) against the capital labour ratio (measured in capital per unit of labour) from 
1964/65 to 1997/98 and found that labour productivity tracked the capital labour ratio until 
1990/91 until, as indicated, labour productivity observations began to plot significantly above 
the capital labour ratio trend, with each observation moving significantly further above the 
trend line. Parham (1999) concluded that Australia's labour productivity was some 15% 
higher than it would have been had the economy remained on its 1964/64 to 1990/91 growth 
path. Wooden (2000) observes a productivity change unparalleled in Australia's history, 
summed up in the following way: with the same level of labour and capital, Australian 
workers are producing far more as a result of working harder and/or smarter. 
Productivity change has occurred in a period of not only significant industrial relations reform 
but also of industry restructuring driven by both commercial imperatives and National 
Competition Policy (NCP) reform. 
This productivity reinforces the NILS (1998) findings to the effect that management 
perceived improved productivity as a consequence of introducing collective agreements in 
Australia. While managers also identified less improvement in quality, the participative 
processes associated with enterprise agreements is consistent with approaches that lead to 
both quality and productivity improvement. Towe (1990) identifies the essential elements of 
the quality issue — employee involvement, skills training, and an organisational structure that 
allows the implementation of creative solutions to problems, all leading to reduced costs and 
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improved performance. Such findings reinforce the role of enterprise agreements as tools to 
integrate organisational development and industrial relations practices in a manner that 
potentially improves productivity. 
The coincidence between labour productivity and the introduction of enterprise agreements 
is identified in Table 2.7. Consistent with other analyses this does not prove causation but 
provides a strong indication of a positive relationship between the introduction of enterprise 
agreements and increases in labour productivity. When combined with Towe's conclusions, 
there is strength in the argument that the processes associated with the negotiation and 
introduction of enterprise agreements are fostering increases in innovation and contribution, 
leading to improved labour productivity. 
Figure 2.7 Labour Productivity Relative to Employees Gaining Coverage by Enterprise 
Agreements 
Figures 2.8 to 2.10 map the relationship between labour productivity and EBA coverage for 
each of the three sectors; the production/resources sector, the margins sector and the 
service sector. While the productivity trend line demonstrates similar patterns the trend in 
coverage demonstrates slight variations between sectors. 
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Figure 2.8 Production/Resources Sector - Labour Productivity Relative to Employees Gaining 
Coverage by Enterprise Agreements 
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Figure 2.9 Service Sector - Labour Productivity Relative to Employees Gaining Coverage by 
Enterprise Agreements 
Figure 2.10. Margin Sector - Labour Productivity Relative to Employees Gaining Coverage by 
Enterprise Agreements 
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The relationship between labour productivity and the number of employees gaining coverage 
by enterprise agreements represented in Figures 2.8 — 2.10 highlights one of the key 
questions addressed in this thesis — is labour productivity influenced by the negotiation and 
- 
uptake of enterprise agreements? If so is that influence consistent across each sector of the 
economy? These questions are addressed in the following chapters of this thesis. 
2.5. Wages 
This section is dedicated to an examination of the influence and impact of the introduction of 
enterprise agreements on wages. Wage earnings and the factors that determine them are of 
central interest for economic policy. This interest arises from the flow on effect from wage 
earnings into consumption, inflation and interest rates. From a microeconomic perspective 
wage earnings are central to employee recruitment, retention and motivation. These 
dimensions have led to tensions in the philosophy underpinning wage fixation and between 
notions of wages as a measure of employee contribution and as a method of establishing 
equity. 
There are concerns expressed about the demise of comparative wage justice in this new 
bargaining environment. The focus of the Australian Industrial Commission at the end of the 
period under examination was the determination of minimum standards underpinning 
enterprise agreements and to provide coverage for those employees not employed under an 
enterprise agreement. Judgements were legally enforceable throughout the industrial 
commission jurisdiction. Notwithstanding, writers have expressed concern for wages justice. 
Alexander and Green (1992) consider that the introduction of decentralised bargaining will 
result in a two tiered system, one group which is well organised and well paid and a 
periphery of low paid insecure employees filling positions of low status. They argue that tariff 
policy has been central to the establishment of the centralised industrial relations system in 
Australia and equally responsible for its unravelling because of the need to match wages to 
63 
enterprise performance in the face of international competition. 
It is the view of Pocock (1995) that full enterprise bargaining processes will disadvantage 
female workers by expanding the gender gap in wage income; through reduced salary 
loadings and through the loss of union protection. More generally, Burgess (1995) notes a 
trend towards greater wage disparity under enterprise bargaining and rejects the argument 
that wage growth in the first half of the 1990s was excessive. Green (1997) argues for the 
extension of the living wage concept to address disparities between award and enterprise 
bargaining wage increases otherwise he sees the transformation of awards and tribunal 
decisions into a low pay ghetto with little if any relevance to the mainstream dynamic of 
Australian wage fixation. Dabscheck (1997) also shares Green's concerns specifically those 
in relation to the living wage concept. Dabscheck observes that those without bargaining 
power are falling behind in real and relative terms. 
The general contention about the effects of enterprise bargaining on the gender-earnings 
gap is analysed by Wooden (1997). In contrast to this negative view, Wooden finds that 
enterprise bargaining is not the cause in this instance, rather the gap is explained largely by 
the concentration of female workers in part time employment where bargaining is actually 
less prevalent. In fact, females in female dominated industries are benefiting from 
favourable wage outcomes as a consequence of enterprise bargaining. Wooden (2001) also 
examines the union — non union wage gap and finds that earlier studies, in particular Mulvey 
and Miller (1996), have underestimated this second gap and by so doing have understated 
the role of union wage effects. In determining that substantial union induced wage effects 
exist, Wooden used matched employer/employee data to allow union wage outcomes in 
specific workplaces to be identified. 
Wooden's study indicates that there are earnings benefits in workplaces covered by 
enterprise or workplace based agreements, and that the emergence of a union wage mark 
up in the enterprise bargaining process may attract workers back to union membership. 
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These beneficial aspects of enterprise bargaining include its role in obtaining agreements in 
the process of redundancy or retrenchment. This is the main finding of Campbell and 
Rimmer's (1994) evaluation of four management approaches to redundancy/retrenchment. 
Wages are critical within the economy from equity, productivity and competitive 
perspectives. The concept of wage flexibility is the key differentiator between the 
neoclassical approach to labour market mechanisms and other approaches. Neoclassical 
labour market theory proposes that wage rates are flexible, adjusting to imbalances in 
labour supply and demand. The neoclassical proposition is challenged by other schools of 
thought contending that in the short run wage rates are rigid, resisting downward pressure n 
the face of excess supply. 
Drago & Perlman (1989) find that firms resist cutting wages, even in the presence of 
substantial unemployment, because of the negative impact on motivation. The concept of an 
efficiency wage is widely recognised, however the motive underlying the efficiency wage 
differs across economic schools of thought. The neoclassical school emphasises its role as 
a sanction, while for example, the institutional school identifies it as an investment in trust 
building. 
The tension between the economic rationalist or free market, neoclassical approach and the 
institutional school, is derived primarily from the difference in policy prescription. Green 
(1995) argues that in the modern context the neoclassical approach identifies low wages as 
the basis of the economy's future, rather than a future based on highly skilled and productive 
firms focused on value adding and on knowledge based products and services. Such an 
approach reinforces the segmentation of the labour market, one of the key concepts within 
the institutional school. 
Wage rigidity is traditionally demonstrated in the Phillips Curve. Phillips (1958) concludes that 
the relationship between unemployment and the rate of change in wage rates as likely to be 
non-linear, but downward sloping. This conclusion was premised firstly on the reluctance of 
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people to offer their services at less than the prevailing rates even when the demand for 
labour is low and unemployment is high. In Australia this sticky wage characteristic is 
institutionalised by way of minimum employment conditions. Secondly Phillips proposed that 
periods of excess demand for or excess supply of labour influence the rate of change in 
wage rates and finally he proposed that the rate of change in consumer prices only 
influenced wage rates when there was a very rapid increase in retail prices. 
Borland & Kennedy (2002) adopt the Phillips approach as their starting point to analyse 
wage rigidity in Australia, concluding that wages are indeed "sticky", and reflect similar 
downward rigidity to those in other developed economies. 
The development of an enterprise agreement can lead to the introduction of motivation, 
retention and attraction strategies within the organisation. In developing and negotiating a 
sustainable wage position the enterprise now has to determine both the level and the criteria 
for any increases. In the previous wage fixing regime such decisions were, for the most part, 
carried out by external bodies. The previous discussion indicates that the decision cannot 
always be totally internalised as it is made within a competitive market environment subject 
to minimum standards. 
However the development of a nexus between labour productivity and wages is an important 
baseline, around which policies required to ensure social outcomes can be applied. The 
following table indicates that since the mid 1990's, the relationship between labour 
productivity and earnings, as measured by total employee compensation, has undergone 
significant change. 
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Figure 2.11. Comparison of Labour Productivity and Total Compensation of Employees 
Figure 2.11. provides an indication that since 1983 earnings, measured by total 
compensation for employees and labour productivity, exhibit differing characteristics. From 
1983 until 1997 compensation grew at a faster rate than labour productivity. From then until 
to 2004, employee compensation and labour productivity exhibited a relatively parallel 
course, while from 2004, employee compensation has begun to grow at a faster rate than 
labour productivity. The rate of convergence demonstrates the difficulty of achieving 
significant structural change in an economy such as Australia. Enterprise agreements were 
introduced from 1993, 3 to 4 years after this event, there is preliminary evidence that 
changes in labour costs tended to match changes in labour productivity. The parameters of 
this relationship are the focus of much of the balance of this thesis. 
In this chapter I have demonstrated that the uptake of enterprise level collective agreements 
was influenced by the approach taken in specific enterprises and by their general 
relationship to labour productivity. Case studies have been used to highlight the 
organisational changes introduced to achieve productivity improvement introduced as part of 
agreement negotiations. The role of the enterprise agreement to formalise the changes 
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negotiated and processes to be implemented has been highlighted. In particular they 
provided an opportunity for enterprises to use the negotiating process to implement 
strategies that allowed to them efficiently meet and adapt to market needs. From a larger 
sample perspective, the NILS (1998) comparative analysis identified a range of positive 
outcomes associated with the introduction of enterprise agreements, but was ambiguous in 
the perception of their impact on productivity. 
Wage justice has emerged as a significant issue when wages are set and adjusted at the 
enterprise level, and particularly so in particular in enterprises and sectors characterised by 
high proportions of part-time employment where employee power is arguably reduced 
relative to organisations characterised by high proportions of full-time employment. Again, 
writers express significant variation in their views and conclusions in relation to the impact of 
enterprise agreements on wages. Similarly the role and influence of unions as a negotiating 
agent in enterprise agreements is subject to debate and ambiguity as to the impact of their 
role. 
In the following chapter I derive a theoretical framework on which to test the impact of the 
decentralisation policy on both labour productivity and wage earnings. 
68 
CHAPTER THREE - MODELLING FOUNDATIONS, ESTIMATING 
TECHNIQUES AND DATA 
3.1. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to determine an appropriate econometric approach to confirm 
the findings and issues outlined in Chapter 2. This chapter presents the econometric 
modelling foundation and approach used to answer the questions posed in Chapter Two; 
whether the negotiation of enterprise level collective bargaining agreements had an impact 
on labour productivity and whether there was a flow-on to wage earnings. 
The identification of any flow-on from productivity to wage earnings is important. In Australia 
wage earnings had traditionally and primarily been determined by changes in workers' real 
purchasing power, if the negotiation of enterprise level agreements resulted in wage 
earnings being determined by an output/efficiency measure (labour productivity), it would be 
a major change and demonstration of the success of the EBA policy. 
In Section 3.2 I detail the foundations of the productivity and wage modelling and derive the 
econometric form of the equations used in estimating the results. Section 3.3 is a discussion 
of modelling techniques appropriate to the characteristics of the data set and the diagnostics 
applied to ensure the validity of the results. The final section 3.4, is a description of the data 
set used in the econometric estimation. 
The explanation of labour productivity is based on the well established use of the Cobb 
Douglas Production Function, see Rogers (1998). Wages are modelled using an established 
empirical foundation, based on the seminal paper by Johnson, Mahar & Thompson (1974). 
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3.2. Modelling Foundations 
3.2.1. Production Function and Productivity Equation 
Chain volume added per employee hour has been selected as the dependent variable in 
analysing the impact of the introduction of EBAs on productivity in Australia. Chain volume 
added has the advantage of including partly completed production in addition to finished 
units, thus providing a complete measure of the level of production from the production chain 
over any specified period. 
Chain volume added by industry i is the variable to be explained in expression (1) below and 
the explanatory variable are evident in the following production function: 
(Ki ,LR ,Lt ,EBA i ,Ui ) 	 (3.2.1) 
This identifies that chain volume added in industry (i) is explained by the capital stock (K,) 
consumed in production by that industry; part time employment (Lp,) and full time 
employment (Lfi) both measured in hours expended; the number of EBAs in industry (i) and 
the number of union members (Ui). If constant returns to scale are assumed to apply to the 
productions function (3.2.1.), then it may be written as explaining the average product of 
labour ( Y, = Y,/L,) in industry (/), as follows: 
(
K i Lpi EBAi Ui j 
L i Li Li Li 'Li 
(3.2.2) 
Output per worker (Y1L 1 ) is determined by the capital/labour ratio (K 1 /L,) in industry (i), 
the proportion of the industry labour force employed part-time (L /L), the proportion of the 
industry labour force employed full time (L f X), the proportion of industry employees 
covered by enterprise bargaining agreements (EBAIL,) in industry (0, and union density 
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(U /1_,) being the proportion of union members in an industry. Equation 3.2.3 includes both 
the full and part-time employment proportions. The basis for inclusion is that over the time 
period and within specific industries different employment patterns may emerge, for example 
over a number of years part-time may increase to be later replaced by full-time employment, 
in both instances they may have similar influence on productivity. As the two are not 
necessarily binary in their influence they are both included. 
Equation 3.2.3 includes both the full and part-time employment proportions. The basis for 
inclusion is that over the time period and within specific industries different employment 
patterns may emerge, for example over a number of years part-time may increase to be later 
replaced by full-time employment, in both instances they may have similar influence on 
productivity. As the two are not necessarily binary in their influence they are both included. 
A log linear form of (3.2.1) yields an econometric interpretation of (3.2.1.): 
y i = a + a lk it + a 2 lpit + a 3 I fit + a 4eba it + a 5U it + c it 	(3.2.3.) 
In (3.4.3), lower case notation indicates the logarithmic value of the variables defined above: 
yi, ki, l, I tt , eba, t and 14 are the logarithms of industry labour productivity, the industry 
capital labour ratio, the part and full-time labour proportions l and If  , the industry incidence 
of EBAs and union membership as a proportion of industry employment respectively. The t 
subscript is included to accommodate the following panel data approach to the estimation of 
(3.2.3.). The notation e  an error term. 
Lags are introduced to reflect the nature of the relationship between the introduction of a 
change to industry award conditions and the time required to observe the impact. In (3.2.3.) 
agreement variables are lagged one year to reflect the time lag associated with 
implementation of the initiatives within the enterprise. 
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The reasons for including the proportions of labour employed part time and full time, and 
union density in industry (0 are discussed in the following sub sections 3.2.2. and 3.2.3. 
3.2.2. The Employment Contract and Productivity 
The trend to part-time work is one of the most evident and contentious manifestations of 
increased workplace flexibility. There is a tendency towards the incidence of part-time and 
away from full-time employment particularly in the service sector. This is a feature of several 
reformed IR systems prevailing in the developed world and is more attractive to some 
employers, particularly when it comes to questions about redundancy and dismissal. The 
working conditions of full-time workers are often protected by the terms of the full-time 
contract and the dismissal or redundancy options can be relatively expensive. Part-time 
workers are often employed on a casual basis allowing managers to terminate them at short 
notice and at a smaller cost to the employer. The distinction between part time and casual 
work has been clarified by judicial decision, limiting its misuse as a means of reducing the 
termination conditions of permanent part time employees. According to Madden (2003), 
there is a close correspondence between part-time employment and casualisation of the 
workforce and that employers prefer the flexibility afforded by part-time contracts. By way of 
contrast, Madden finds that employees prefer the job security provided by the terms of full-
time contracts in comparison with the lack of it in part-time or casual employment. As 
identified in Chapter Two, other writers contend that part time employment provides 
opportunities to those for whom full time work is unsuitable or unavailable. 
Given opposing attitudes to part and full-time contracts between Australian workers and 
employers, it is possible that part-time and full-time employment have different effects on 
overall labour productivity. To capture this effect, proxies for part-time (L pi ) and full-time 
(I f ) employment are included as separate arguments in the industry production function 
underpinning the analysis of productivity. In this context, it is appropriate to regard part-time 
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and full-time employment as substitutes with the stock of industry capital (K,). 
3.2.3. Unions and Productivity 
Two fundamental changes within the Australian IR environment are the increasing incidence 
of industry Enterprise Bargaining Agreements (EBAs) and decreasing levels of union 
membership (U i ) across Australian industries. The proportion of industry employment 
signed to an agreement in that year features as an argument in the production function used 
to analyse the labour productivity impact of agreements. 
The effect of unions on productivity may have declined along with the reduced proportion of 
union membership although the effects are unclear. The level of union membership within a 
sector, as a proxy for the degree of influence of the union on productivity is problematic. A 
concern associated with this traditional measure is that the density of membership is not 
necessarily correlated with union influence in the bargaining process. This is evidenced as 
follows; the EBAs included in this data set are collective agreements. These agreements are 
negotiated between employer and employee representatives, where the union is recognised 
as a formal partner to the agreement (as is often the case in any underlying Award). In this 
instance the union is involved, regardless of, for example, diminishing membership. While it 
may be only a proportion of the workforce formally represented in, and voting on, the 
agreement, the balance of employees are also bound by such agreements. 
If the introduction of EBAs as an IR tool, or its conditions, are opposed or not directly 
supported by union members, then the union contribution to productivity may be negative. 
However, some Australian unions and their members have willingly supported the 
introduction of EBAs and in such instances the union contribution to productivity may be 
positive. Union density across industry (U i ) is included as an argument in the underlying 
production function (3.2.1.). 
73 
3.3 Earnings Equation 
This section seeks to determine whether wage earnings, as a result of introducing enterprise 
bargaining agreements are now determined by some output measure (productivity), rather 
than being determined by a price index measure designed to ensure the maintenance of 
purchasing power. 
The estimation of the impact of the decentralisation of industrial relations decision making 
through EBAs on earnings is empirically based. The variable used to measure earnings is 
wage earnings per hour worked. This is constructed from two data sources, the amount 
spent on wages and salaries and hours worked by all categories of labour, full or part time, 
normal hours or overtime hours. This has provided a picture of the average return to the 
employee per hour worked. 
Approaches to the study of wages and earnings are influenced by differing schools of 
industrial relations thought. In some instances the approaches are based on comprehensive 
models designed to reflect behavioural and management theory. In others, the approaches 
are based on reduced forms, for example determining whether wages affect employee 
retention or motivation. While writers such as Layard (1991) have developed broad systems 
based models, there is a significant and accepted practice of building models reflecting the 
key economy wide determinants of wages, or as in the Phillips case, only a few factors are 
used to determine interrelationships. In some models, such as with Kennedy and Borland 
(2000) , these base models are then expanded to include the explanatory variables of 
interest. This latter approach has been adopted as the foundation for modelling the potential 
impact of EBAs on earnings. It is however important to review the key interrelationships and 
the associated modelling to ensure the expansion of the basic model is valid. 
Wages, in their most basic form, are an economic exchange between an employer and 
employee reflecting some valuation of the contribution the employee makes to the 
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employers enterprise. The parameters of this exchange are affected by a wide range of 
factors, including the profitability of the enterprise, the supply of and demand for labour and 
competition for particular characteristics of labour. In essence, the application of many of 
these parameters can be condensed into a measure of the distribution of relative power 
between employers and employees. In the longer run a range of institutions and 
interventions are developed to ensure that perceived maldistribution of power in the 
exchange is moderated to reflect dominant societal views of equity in earnings and the 
principles of the labour/earnings exchange. Interventions, such as those of the legal system 
and government arising from the Harvester Case outlined in Chapter 2, can be viewed as 
either a valid reflection of national values manifesting themselves in wages, or unnecessary 
distortions of the labour market. 
Much of the theory and associated modelling is based on the assumption of immutable 
tension between employers and employees and lack of goal congruence. This assumption is 
at odds with much contemporary organisational behaviour theory and modelling that is 
underpinned by cooperative, outcome oriented approaches to business. 
The next section of this chapter focuses on enterprise level issues associated with the 
determination of wage earnings, including the impact of institutional aspects and economy 
wide factors such as unemployment. These provide the modelling parameters used as the 
basis for the earnings model. 
3.3.1. Earnings and Employee Motivation, Retention and Recruitment 
The ability to associate earnings with effort and contribution as the primary determinant of 
wages, rather than a transaction determined primarily on time spent in the workplace, has 
proven to be a major challenge to Australian firms and employees in the transition to 
enterprise level bargaining. The traditional Australian award system focused very much on 
hours of work and pay rates, with penalty clauses for additional hours of work, leaving the 
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productivity aspect of the relationship as a separate management issue. This highlights the 
proposition that unless people are motivated, the time people spend at work is not 
necessarily productive. The interdependency between a firm's output performance and its 
wage levels, the firm and other enterprises, and the firm's wage and labour market 
conditions is addressed in the motivation, recruitment and retention wage analysis 
framework. 
The interdependency between a firm's output performance and its wage levels, between the 
firm and other enterprises and between the firms wage and labour market conditions is 
addressed in the motivation, recruitment and retention wage analysis framework. 
Assume each employee produces E units of output where effort (E,), in the firm depends on 
the firm's relative wage and also on unemployment. This assumption is underpinned by the 
argument that motivation is a function of the relative treatment (reflected in wages), of the 
characteristics of an unemployed state being less attractive than work. This relationship is 
presented below. 
E i = e (Wi/W it, u) 	 (3.3.1) 
If output depends on total effort EiNi, the profit maximising condition will ensure the firm will 
negotiate a wage based on the following relationship: 
n- = R(EN) — WN 1 = R(E i N i ) — (W i/E i )E i N i 	 (3.3.2) 
subject to the relationship between wages and effort, R being real revenue earned by the 
firm. Firstly the firm will seek a wage to minimise cost per unit of effort (Wi7E0 and secondly 
to maximise profit, given wages and effort. To minimise W/E„ wages must be raised so long 
as effort rises faster than wages. Both Wand E, increase at the same level at the optimum. 
This is defined as the Solow condition, implying that: 
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e(Wme,u)w iNve = e(Wme, u) 
This partial equilibrium gives the firm-level wage equation (W,) as a function of the expected 
wage outside the firm (We) and the level of unemployment (u). The relationship highlights 
the interdependency between firm-level wages and external factors. And if power is 
relatively evenly distributed between employers and employees, it highlights also the 
importance of organisation development and negotiation as a means of achieving non-wage 
benefits to retain employees and achieve optimal profit outcomes. 
This model implies that in a period of high unemployment, firms can apply less effort to 
motivating employees because of both the employer's relatively powerful position and that 
sanction can be used as the motivational force. 
Wages are also used to prevent people leaving the firm, in particular where the embedded 
human capital is considered critical to performance and where training is a costly process. 
Depending on their desire for higher wages and their perceptions of the cost of migration 
between employers, employees will have individual propensities to migrate to higher paying 
sectors. Resignations also incur a cost to the firm. The loss of personnel equates to a loss of 
human capital, the replacement of which costs the firm in the form of recruitment of new 
personnel and their training, a factor of increasing importance in knowledge and relationship 
based business models. 
The quit rate is defined by Layard (1991) as a function of internal and external wages, with 
the likelihood of gaining alternate employment 
q = q(W,NVe, u) 
From this, the firm's steady state of profit is as follows 
71" = R(N,) — [W, + 0 q (W,/W e 'u)]N, 
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where R is recruitment cost and Ni represents the leavers in period (0. This relationship is 
optimised by minimising the cost per worker and achieving the appropriate employment 
level. 
However, the variables included in this equation are not necessarily within the control of the 
firm. Competitive behaviour by other firms, particularly in areas of skill shortages, creates a 
need to respond to labour market rates in an effort to retain skills and enterprise capability. 
The responses can take the form of rates that are over the award or agreement derived 
wage structures. Wages drift, a general upward movement of wage rates within a firm or 
sector, can be initiated by earlier short run requirement to pay a wage premium for a 
particular skills set. The initial step can establish a new internal benchmark around which 
relativities are then established. The factors that contribute to employee retention by 
providing relatively attractive employment conditions, can also contribute to the firm's ability 
to attract new employees 
Factors contributing to employee retention, also contribute to the firm's ability to recruit new 
employees. Firms may consider that they can attract and recruit personnel more quickly if 
they offer a higher relative wage. As a result hires (H,) is given by 
H i = h(W i/We, u) V ; 
Where Vi is the firms vacancy level. 
The firm has Ni leavers per period, and wishes to replace them. It can secure a flow of 
recruits by either raising wages or by creating job vacancies. Both options incur costs, the 
first by increasing the direct wages bill and the second by incurring a net cost of an empty 
workplace (0 ). 
The firm's profits are then defined in the following manner: 
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Tr ; = R(1\) — (W i + O WNION ;  
Since, in a steady state, the firm sets H 1 = 
The wage is aga in set to min imise the net cost of labou r, includ ing hiring costs, an increase  
in vacancies costs or tu rnover rate increases eq u ilibrium u nemployment.  
There are three  
The ability to generate revenue;  • 	
• 	
• 
Relative wages; and 
The u nemployment rate.  
Where a ble, firms choose wage and emp loyment levels to maximise profits. The motivation, 
deve lop ing huma n capita l, rather tha n be ing re liant on recru it ing such skills. In such an  
influenced by the demand side of the market and their competitors, the supp ly side. Firms  
identified above held true. Firms operate within an industry secto r, their decis ions are 
where the firm is adapting to high staff tu rnover. The perspective need not be the case.  
Many firms experience low tu rnover and still have sign ificant long term investment in  















































































































































environment, unemployment levels are arguably overemphasised as a wage determinant. 
The focus on recruitment, retention and unemployment infers a short run perspective where 
the firm is adapting to a high staff turn-over . This situation is not always the case, many 
firms experience low turnover and have significant long term investment in developing 
human capital, rather than being reliant on recruiting such skills, in this environment, 
unemployment levels are arguably overemphasised as a wage determinant. Within the firm's 
decision making, unemployment may be a greater issue as an indicator of the likely demand 
for products or services, rather than as a factor in labour relations. 
The retention and recruitment relationships identified above place considerable emphasis on 
the unemployment rate as a proxy for the ease with which employees can move between 
employers and from this, access improved wage earnings. The unemployment rate could be 
considered a useful supply side variable if labour was homogenous, that is, a uniform input 
into the production process. In many instances, for example, in the delivery of services 
where the quality of human capital is critical, a demand side variable such as the vacancy 
rate within the sector may have greater validity as an indicator of the potential for employees 
to be able to find alternate employment and from this, to increase their relative power in such 
bargaining. 
3.3.2. Inter-industry Differentials Between Wage Levels 
While it has been observed that employee capability is not necessarily homogenous, there 
are many employee attributes that can be applied across different sectors. Consequently 
enterprises not only compete for labour with firms in their sector, they also compete with 
firms operating within other sectors and industries. 
The interest in industry differentials is in response to the question as to whether wages for 
similar workers with the same job characteristics are the same across industries an issue 
raised by Layard (1991). Australia has historically experienced consistency in wage levels 
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and employment condition within Industry Awards. This situation results from the centralised 
industrial decision processes ensuring flow-on effects from benchmarks established in the 
successful export sectors. There is evidence in Australia of some sectors being 
characterised by higher wage earnings for particular skills than in other sectors, in these 
instances the award rates applied only to less highly performing sectors. This provides a 
linkage between sectors that are performing relatively well at a particular time, traditionally it 
has been the major resource export sectors and more recently, in financial and business 
services sector stimulated by the IT revolution and increasing globalisation. 
Layard (1991) identifies that the most powerful explanatory variables for the existence of 
wage differentials include the capital/labour ratio, profitability and the degree of unionisation. 
Firms that are more intensive in their use of capital, and often larger, pay more, in part 
because the technology applied through the use of capital induces more discipline in worker 
effort by ensuring standard operating procedures are applied. Profitability allows these 
employers to bestow a gift, while the union effect in a collective bargaining model, bestows a 
threat effect in negotiation. The ability for unions to apply a greater threat effect in sectors 
experiencing high profitability introduces an opportunity cost effect of strike action; whereas 
in less profitable, or loss making sectors, the threat is transferred as a cost to their members. 
3.3.3. Unionisation, Bargaining and Wages 
Following centuries of collective association by craft specialists, craft unions were developed 
in the last quarter of the 19th century to provide a collective voice and basis of action to 
counter perceived power imbalances between employers and employees in negotiation of 
wages and conditions. The structure of unions in Australia has altered at the close of the 20 th 
century to reflect an industry/sector characteristic. This has resulted in an increase in the 
incidence of enterprises negotiating with a single union to produce a single award and/or 
agreement of fixed duration for the enterprise. Allegations of union processes resulting in 
pattern bargaining and upward drift in wage rates arise from the simultaneous use of a 
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single bargaining unit to negotiate agreements within a number of enterprises. The concern 
is that this outcome diminishes the enterprise specific nature of the agreement and replaces 
it with what is effectively a sector level agreement. These claims are made particularly in 
sectors where agreements fall due on approximately the same date. 
In Australia, much of the wage setting occurs within a collective bargaining environment, 
involving labour unions as the employee bargaining entity. As identified in Chapter 2, very 
few non-union agreements have been lodged in the federal jurisdiction, despite the ability for 
firms and their employees to develop them, independently of union involvement. This is 
despite the downward trend in union membership resulting in many firms having a lower 
proportion of their employees in union membership. 
At the most basic level, bargaining over wages centres on the balance between wages and 
effort. Layard (1991) contends that the union is concerned only with existing workers and the 
objective of maximising the income of the median worker. The objective is given by 
V ; = SW ; + (1-S 1 )A ; 
Where W, is the real wage of firm , measured in units of GDP, Si is the probability of being 
employed by the same firm the next period (dependent upon the wage bargain) and A is the 
expected real income of the worker who loses or changes their job. At the time of bargaining 
it is assumed that there is some uncertainty about some aspects of the firm's future 
performance. The expected alternative income (A) is given by A = (1- q u)We + q uB, where 
W e is the expected real outside wage, B is the real unemployment benefit and co is a 
constant that depends positively on the discount rate and negatively on the turnover rate. 
While this approach to modelling the role of unions reflects the retention model identified 
above, it introduces a strategic element missing in the former. This occurs through the 
inclusion of the probability of being employed by the firm in the next period, a factor 
dependent on the future success of the business. It further introduces the potential to 
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consider the likelihood of a greater differential between expected outside wage than that of 
the firm, if the firm is successful. This approach provides an opportunity to consider multi-
layer rewards, those combining base increases and performance based rewards. 
Introducing business strategy into the union negotiating process, results in ambiguity in the 
direction of union influence on wages. If the firm fails to meet its strategic objectives, the two 
tiered approach identified above, may dampen the short term influence of the union on wage 
earnings. 
3.3.4. Unemployment and Wages 
The above models indicate unemployment is a key influence in determining wage levels. 
The influence of unemployment on wages is evident in both firm wage theory and in insider 
power theory. The evidence about unemployment as an influence on the direction of wage 
movements in Australia and other developed economies is mixed. 
The relationship between wages and unemployment is explored in a wages curve model, 
analysed by Kennedy and Borland (2000). This analysis established that a wages curve, 
similar to that existing in the UK and US, did exist in Australia, although the wage setting 
institutions and standards in the sample of countries were markedly different. The influence 
of unemployment is generally found to limit the rate of increase in wages, rather than to drive 
wages downwards across developed industrial economies. 
3.3.5. Macro Approaches to Modelling Wage Earnings 
Jonson, Mahar & Thompson (1974) undertook experimental work using single equation 
estimation to determine the factors explaining movements in average weekly earning per 
employed male unit. The structure of this experiment was built on previous econometric 
analysis in the United Kingdom, United States and other overseas countries, based in 
particular on the work of Phillips (1958). The Phillips Model identified the three main 
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determinants of the rate of increase in wage earnings per man to be as follows: 
• The demand for labour; 
• The rate of change in the demand for labour; 
• The rate of change in both wage and commodity prices. 
Jonson, Mahar & Thompson's (JMT) single equation estimate is designed to explain the 
movement in average money wage earning per man on a quarterly basis. Recognising the 
uniqueness of the Australian Industrial Relations System, JMT introduced award wages as a 
factor affecting wage earnings as part of a set of independent variables. Unlike Phillips who 
identified U, the percentage increase in unemployment, as the demand for labour variable, 
Jonson, Mahar & Thompson used the percentage change in V/U where V is the vacancy 
level as a proxy for the demand for labour. Further inclusions in the set of independent 
variables were the level of foreign reserves, world prices and domestic productivity. 
The rationale for the inclusion of the level of foreign reserves was the impact of foreign 
reserves on future inflation rates. The world prices variable was included on the basis that 
high world prices lead to more generous wage settlements in export and import competing 
industries. In relation to overseas studies, the inclusion of a domestic productivity variable 
was influenced by the finding which identified a strong relationship between productivity 
and/or profits and wage earnings per man. 
The following variables, namely the percentage rate of increase in award wages, domestic 
productivity, world prices and import prices were lagged in the estimation. 
JMT conclude that while the variables included in their estimation are significant and positive 
in affecting wage outcomes, Durbin Watson tests indicate they are neither satisfactory, nor 
unsatisfactory as explanatory variables. Challen & Hagger (1979) identify two elements of 
the findings as noteworthy. The first finding is the similarity of the Australian results with 
overseas studies in relation to commonly used variables and the second the influence of the 
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rate of change of the award wages variable. This variable was highly significant, but with a 
coefficient less than unity, implying award wage increases are not fully passed on into 
earnings. This is indicative of an industry response that reduces over award payments as a 
means of softening the impact of externally driven wage increases. The decision on the level 
and application of over award payment was one of few choices available to the employer 
within the centralised industrial relations system. 
The influence of Arbitration Commission decisions on wage earnings was central to the JMT 
modelling. In particular, their study reflected the 1967 total wage concept, they reflected this 
by considering the basic wage element of the overall award wage decision; which was 
comprised of the basic wage and metal trades margins, against the National Wage Case 
decision post 1967. 
In some respects the pre 1967 approach, a basic wage decision and a metal trades margin 
component, was analogous to the current system of minimum standards above which 
enterprises could negotiate with employees. While the earlier model was centrally 
negotiated, it also reflected performance and differing sectors capacity to pay. As argued by 
the craft based unions at the Arbitration Commission, these included sectors employing 
metal trades. 
In reaching the above conclusion JMT designed their model to test a range of views on the 
decision criteria applied by, and operations of, the Industrial Relations Commission. At one 
extreme is the view that the Commission was merely a rubber stamp, implying that it merely 
applied an award increase reflecting the rate of increase in wage earnings occurring in the 
labour market, in effect capturing the wages drift criteria and providing a safety net for those 
employees whose wage rates had not drifted upwards. The view that wage decisions were 
made on political criteria was also considered. This view was premised on the conclusion 
that the nature of the decision reflected an appropriate wage increase ensuring maintenance 
of the system itself. A third, intermediate view was that while increases in award wages 
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flowed on to wage earnings, the increases were offset by enterprises reducing over award 
payments. JMT's modelling supports the third view, the first and second being rejected. The 
finding is important from a number of perspectives, because it identifies that the 
Commission, through its award wage decisions was significant in influencing wage earnings 
and the flow on from award wage decisions to average wage earnings occurs almost 
immediately. However, enterprises diminish the impact of the award decision by reducing 
over award payments to achieve an acceptable wage earnings result. 
The wage earnings findings indicate that enterprises had developed mechanisms to 
accommodate the external changes centralised industrial relations processes imposed upon 
them. 
The variables included by JMT reflect the 1974 policy settings, in particular a fixed rate of 
exchange between the Australian dollar and its trading partners and the centralised 
industrial relations system. Challen & Hagger (1979) criticise the modelling for its theoretical 
weakness, however its exploratory nature, consistent with approaches with earlier US and 
UK modelling is also acknowledged. 
An important finding of the Jonson, Mahar and Thompson research is the identification of 
"wages drift", this is an upward drift in wages arising from enterprise and sector based 
negotiation outside and above the formalised wage structure in response to excess demand 
for labour and productivity gains. Firms periodically moderated the rate of drift by reducing 
award payment flow-on where over award remuneration existed. This finding allowed a 
separation in modelling by viewing drift as a time based variable reflecting the dynamic 
adjustments in the market. 
The Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) developed a different specification to explain changes 
in Average Weekly Earnings (AWE) within the centralised system policy settings. The small 
scale model (RBA76) developed a composite variable reflecting real wages, labour supply 
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and demand, real stock of money and the ratio of real award wages to the level of real 
award wages consistent with growth at the regular rate. 
The earnings model in this thesis uses earnings per hour as its dependent variable. This 
measure reflects the labour productivity measure used in the productivity estimate, labour 
productivity per hour. This provides a direct comparison between the productivity and 
earnings. The variable is also considered appropriate given the flexibility that has developed 
within the Australian labour market, demonstrated by the incidence of part time, including 
casual work, an hourly employment system. 
3.3.6. Earnings Estimate 
The structure of the following estimation has been informed by the preceding analysis of 
models. 
W 1 = f(P,, 	CPI, 	L i ) 	 (3.3.1) 
Earnings per hour (W,), within this model is determined by labour productivity (P,), the 
industry capital/labour ratio (KIL,), the unemployment rate, the rate of change of prices 
(CPI) and the degree of union membership (U 1 /L 1 ). 
The variables reflect issues identified by Layard, the single equation modelling approaches 
applied by JMT(1974), Phillips (1958)and Kennedy & Borland (2000). Productivity is used as 
a measure of industry performance, the capital labour ratio, CPI, unionisation and 
unemployment are included as in the earlier models. 
A log linear interpretation of (3.3.1) provides an econometric basis for the application of the 
model, detailed in the following chapter along with the productivity model (3.2.3). 
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3.4. Modelling Technique 
3.4.1. Panel Data and its Application to Estimation 
A primary concern in attempting to evaluate the impact of enterprise agreements is the 
selection of an appropriate modelling technique. As EBAs were introduced from 1992, there 
are only a relatively small number of time series observations available. The suitability of 
panel data techniques for modelling cross sectional data, with a limited time series, make it 
an appropriate approach. The choice of panel data was reinforced by the presence of a 
small number of explanatory variables potentially comprising the cross-section analysis. 
Hsiao (2000) identifies the advantages of panel data sets over time series and cross- section 
data sets for this form of analysis. Panel data sets are comprised of 2 dimensions: the cross 
sectional dimension n and the times series dimension T. Hsiao (2000) concludes that panel 
data analysis provides significant advantages over cross sectional or times series 
techniques (points (n, T), as it increases degrees of freedom and reduces collinearity 
amongst explanatory variables. Panel data analysis is an effective tool when applied to 
labour market analysis because it captures change over time while facilitating the modelling 
of more complex behavioural relationships within cross sections (Hsiao 2000). 
The basic regression model for panel data analysis is of the form 
Y it = x' it 
One further major advantage of panel data methods is a capacity to deal with omitted 
(mismeasured or unobserved) variables that may or may not be correlated with the 
explanatory variables in the model. When such correlation occurs and factors are fixed, the 
model is defined as a fixed effects (FE) model. 
The alternate form is a random effects (RE) model where there is no relationship between 
omitted variables and the explanatory variable, this is only appropriate when there is no 
88 
relationship between the error term in the model and the explanatory variables. 
The decision to use a fixed or random effects model is important because of the need to use 
the most efficient approach (see Hsiao 2000). This distinction matters less when the time 
series is large for if T tends to infinity, the LSDV and GLS estimators are identical. 
While there are advantages derived from the panel data technique, there are problems, in 
particular, issues surrounding heterogeneity and selectivity bias. Heterogeneity bias arises 
when significant individual or time effects exist amongst cross sectional or time units and are 
not captured by the explanatory variables. Selectivity bias occurs when the sample is found 
not be random, an outcome affecting either the slope or intercept (or both) of the estimate. 
In the data set applied to this analysis, both the size of the time series (14 years) and the 
number of explanatory variables (n = 5) are small, increasing the importance of selecting the 
appropriate model. The data set includes enterprises drawn from the 17 ANZSIC classified 
industries and could arguably be considered as random draws from the population of 
enterprises. In the RE model there are two basic assumptions. The unobserved effects are 
random draws from a common population and the explanatory variables are exogenous, 
meaning that the error terms are uncorrelated with past, present and future values of the 
regressors. However, there are frequently reasons to believe that in many cases the error 
terms and explanatory variables are correlated. Hsiao (2000) uses the example of the 
production function where output may be affected by unobserved management ability within 
the enterprise leading to more efficient production, as an appropriate use of an FE model. 
The same view applied to the wage earnings equation defined in this chapter where 
omission of factors which may influence union wage demand, for example Industrial 
Commission decisions, could be used to argue the appropriateness of a FE model as the 
preferred model. Greene (2003) provides a discussion based on a regression model of the 
form 
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where there are K regressors in x, r, not including a constant term. Within this model, z'ia is 
defined as the heterogeneity, or individual effect, where z contains a constant term and set 
of observed individual or group specific characteristics. As Greene (2003) identifies, in this 
instance the entire model can estimated by least squares. If however, z is unobserved but 
correlated with xi t then the least squares estimate of 13 is biased and inconsistent as a 
consequence of the omission. This fixed effects model is defined by Greene (2003) as 
= x'43 +a, + Eit 
where a, = z'o embodies all the observable effects and specifies an estimable conditional 
mean. In a fixed effects specification, a i ls a group specific term (that does not vary over 
time) within the regression. 
Following this, if the individual heterogeneity is assumed to be uncorrelated with the 
explanatory variables, Greene (2003) expresses the model as 
= 	+ a + u, + 
where u, is a group specific random element that for each group is a single draw that enters 
the regression identically in each period. This is defined as a random effects approach that 
can be consistently modelled by least squares. 
The nature of the effects present in the panel model can be formally tested using 
misspecification tests. Where the error term is assumed to be random and uncorrelated with 
the explanatory variables, the following hypotheses apply, where a represents the existence 
of correlation between the regressors and omitted individual effects 
Ho : a equals 0 
H 1 : a does not equal 0 
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If H i holds and H o is rejected, the FE is the appropriate model but if H o holds then the RE 
model provides the most appropriate basis, Hsiao (2003). Mundlak (1978) developed a 
specification test using the F ratio, which under H o has a central F distribution K and NT — 
(2K+1) degrees of freedom. Hausman (1978) tests the significance of the difference 
between the OLS and GLS coefficients of the explanatory variables. Under Ho a Wald 
statistic is distributed asymptotically as central chi squared with k degrees of freedom. Under 
H 1 it has a non-central chi squared distribution. Where the chi squared statistic exceeds the 
critical value at the appropriate significance level and degrees of freedom, then 
misspecification of the RE model is inferred. 
The fixed effects estimation requires the explanatory variable to be strictly exogenous. If 
there is an endogenous relationship between them, then the fixed and random effects 
models are both unreliable. This specification requires the model to be estimated using a 
generalised least squares (GLS) approach. 
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3.4.2. Methodology 
The methodology applied to estimate both the labour productivity (3.2.3.) and the wage 
earnings (3.3.1.) models is now described. The first step is to use a serial correlation test 
developed by Wooldridge (2002) to determine whether the equation is appropriately 
specified. The Wooldridge test indicates the absence of serial correlation in both the labour 
productivity and wages equations. The second step is to apply the Granger causality test to 
determine whether the explanatory variables display endogeneity. In light of this the 
productivity equation was respecified by including a one period lag in the capital/labour ratio. 
The revised estimates on Table 4.1 to 4.4 in Chapter Four indicate that the revised form of 
the productivity equation is appropriately specified.. 
The wage earnings equation exhibited neither serial correlation nor endogeneity between 
the explanatory variables. The consequences of the tests were that a RE/FE approach could 
be applied to the wage equation but was inappropriate in application to the productivity 
equation because it does not reflect the necessary exogeneity requirement for explanatory 
variables. 
The change to the modelling approach applied to the labour productivity equation is based 
on the high risk of heteroskedacity. There are a number of potential sources of 
heteroskedasticity including omitted variables; thus when applying a GLS procedure to panel 
data a standard GLS estimator can be applied if the variance components are known. As 
they are unknown, feasible generalised least squares (FGLS) estimators are used to 
estimate the impact of EBAs on labour productivity following Greene (2003). 
Consequently a feasible generalised least squares (FGLS) approach has been applied to 
estimate impact of EBAs on labour productivity. 
The third step applies to the wage earnings equation. This involved testing to see if an FE, 
or RE, estimation is most appropriate for the wage equation. Using the Hausman test, 
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outlined above, I found that the most appropriate method for the wage equation was the 
fixed effects (FE) model. 
The remaining three estimates for each of the dependent variables are applied at the sector 
level. The sectors comprising groups of ANZSIC classified industries reflecting their differing 
output and business model characteristics as defined in Chapter One. This places a 
research emphasis on an important, complementary question: does the impact of enterprise 
bargaining activity on productivity and earnings vary between industry sectors? It is 
conceivable that federal EBAs have a different impact on the production and manufacturing 
industries when compared with their impact in the services sector of the economy. 
3.5. Data 
The following analysis of the impact of enterprise bargaining on labour productivity and wage 
earnings is based on the profile of Enterprise Bargaining Agreements (EBAs) registered in 
the federal jurisdiction from July 1992 to June 2003. This is a subset of all agreements 
registered in Australia, the remainder being those agreements registered in State 
jurisdictions. The data set has been selected because it is a single source of information 
collected and classified in robust and consistent categories. 
The data set comprises collective agreements, those enterprise agreements involving both 
employer and union representatives in a bargaining process. Only a relatively small number 
of agreements have been finalised in the federal jurisdiction since 1996 (until 2003), without 
unions having been party to the agreement. This agreement data set has been kindly 
provided by the Department of Workplace Relations and is not generally available. 
The data is organised as a profile of the number of agreements, number of employees 
covered by agreements and is categorised by agreement type and associated industry at the 
2 digit Australian and New Zealand Standard Industry Classification (ANSZIC) code level. 
For the purpose of this analysis, the ANSZIC codes have been aggregated to the single digit 
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level and modelled as the standard set of 17 industries and as 3 industry sectors, namely 
the production/resources, services and margins sectors of the economy as defined in 
Chapters 1 and 3, above. 
Estimation is based on all agreements registered within the federal jurisdiction. The data set 
includes agreements which differ according to the mechanisms used to determine wage 
increases throughout the agreement period, in particular, those agreements that include 
productivity and pay conditions and those applying independently of any award. The 
modelling is restricted to use of the incidence of all Agreements rather than the range of 
categories identified in Chapter Two because limited sample sizes apply if the sample is 
disaggregated. 
The remainder of the data is drawn from the Australian Bureau 
of Statistics (ABS) for the same period and is detailed as 
follows. 
Labour Productivity: Index variable, base = 1999 = 100, ABS 5204.0 Australian System of National 
Accounts, Table 22, Indexes of Gross Product Per Hour Worked, by Industry (a). 
Union: ABS 6310, Trade Union membership in thousands by Industry. 
Labour: ABS 6291.0.40.001: Labour Force (EJ) Employed — Industry — Australia — Quarterly: Tables 
9g and 9h: Full Time Employed and Part Time Employed by Industry. 
Capital Labour Ratio: ABS 5204.0 Australian System of National Accounts, Table 68. Capital Stock, 
by Industry: created by using end of year net-capital stock from this series and the labour force from 
above and combining with 6302.0 Average Weekly Earnings, Australia. Table 01. Average Weekly 
Earnings by Industry, Australia (Dollars) — Original — Persons, Total Earnings. 
The entire data set is comprised of 238 pooled observations while the production/resources sector is 
comprised of (4 x 14 = 56) in the case of the service sector (9 x 14 = 136) and the margins sector (4 x 
14 = 56) observations for the services industry sector. 
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CHAPTER FOUR - RESULTS PRODUCTIVITY AND WAGE 
EARNINGS 
4. 1. Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to present the findings of an econometric evaluation of whether the 
introduction of Enterprise Bargaining Agreements (EBAs) has impacted on Australian labour 
productivity and subsequently whether productivity has become a determinant of wage 
earnings. Two structural dimensions are included in the evaluation, the Australian economy 
as a whole, combining its 17 industry sectors as described by the ANZSIC system, and this 
classification system aggregated into the 3 sectors described in Chapters 1 and 3 preceding. 
The analysis uses data drawn from the Workplace Agreement Database (WAD) of federal 
enterprise agreements (EBAs) certified in the period dating from 1 January 1992 and 30 
June 2003, applied at Level 1 of the ANZSIC Code. This data set, when combined with 
relevant Australian Bureau of Statistics data, forms a panel for analysis covering the period 
from July 1993 to June 2004. The industry level approach provides a different perspective 
from the recent studies by Tseng & Wooden (2001) and Wooden, Loundes and Tseng 
(2001), who analyse the contribution of enterprise bargaining to productivity using sample 
data from the ABS Business Longitudinal Survey and Australian Workplace Industrial 
Relations Survey respectively. Wooden, Lou ndes and Tseng (2001) conclude that evidence 
of possible links between enterprise bargaining and productivity growth is far from 
conclusive and if enterprise bargaining has given rise to positive productivity effects, virtually 
nothing is known of the mechanisms through which such effects are transmitted. Tseng and 
Wooden find that productivity levels in organisations characterised by the presence of 
registered enterprise agreements are estimated to be 8.8 percent above enterprises without 
such agreements in place and they also note that high productivity firms appear to have a 
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greater capacity and motivation for introducing enterprise agreements. 
The case studies summarised in Chapter 2 are provided as some preliminary, typical 
examples of the mechanisms, applied as part of the EBA development process, that have 
resulted in positive productivity results at the enterprise level. 
This study augments the existing Australian literature by analysing the effects of enterprise 
bargaining agreements (EBAs) on labour productivity at the industry level. It adds a further 
dimension by determining whether the introduction of enterprise based industrial 
negotiations has resulted in productivity becoming a significant determinant of wage 
earnings. This would be a significant departure from the cost of living criteria, measured by 
the Consumer Price Index (CPI) that was once a major determinant in the centralised 
system. 
Both equations have been tested for the presence of autocorrelation by using the 
procedures of Drukker (2003) to apply Wooldridge (20020 test for autocorrelation in panel 
data models. The results appear are discussed below Table 4.1 and 4.6 revealing that there 
is no autocorrelation in the estimates of either equation. 
4.2. Productivity Results 
The explanation of industry labour productivity given in equation (3.2.3) is estimated as a 
cross sectional time series model in four replications: the entire data set including all 17 
classified ANZIC industries; the production and resource based sector; the margins sector 
and services sector. The methodology used to determine the specification of the 
econometric form of the equation and validity of using the GLS cross sectional time series 
model, rather than panel data FE or RE estimation, is described in Chapter 3. 






















Proportion of fte in the labour force 
Proportion of pte in the labour force I f, 
Proportion of employees covered by EBAs 10.0611061 6.28  
1 
Union Density 	 -0.1554857 	-1.16 	-0.248 
Wald Chi2 - 
Prob > Chi 2 
Wooldridge Test F (1,16) 





Table 4.1: Results of Estimating (3.2.3) for ALL INDUSTRIES 
The value of the Wooldridge test statistic indicates that autocorrelation is not a serious 
problem in this model. 
The coefficients on agreements, capital/labour ratio and part-time employment are all 
significant. The impact of agreements and the capital/labour ratio are positive in sign, while 
the proportion of part-time employees is negative in sign. The full-time labour proportion is 
not significant. 
The outstanding result identified in Table 4.1. is the significance of the proportion of 
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0.003 
Capital/labour 
Proportion of pte in the labour force l. , 
Proportion of employees covered by EBAs 
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Wald Chi 2 - 















employees covered by enterprise bargaining agreements (EBAs) in determining Australia's 
labour productivity. In the model the coefficient (+0.061) is highly significant and positively 
signed. The capital/labour ratio (k11,) increases industry labour productivity significantly 
while it is clear from Table 1 that the nature of the employment contract matters for Australia 
industry productivity. The model indicates that as the part-time proportion of the workforce 
increases, industry labour productivity declines. The implications of these results are 
explained in the concluding section. 
It is conceivable that this explanation of the determinants of Australian labour productivity 
across the economy as a whole does not equally apply to specific sectors of the economy. 
The subsequent question is whether the economy wide results carry over into each of the 
three sub groups that have been defined. This question is addressed the following tables 
which provide the GLS results for those sectors. 
Table 4.2: Results of Estimating (3.2.3) for the Production/Resources Sector 
The coefficients on agreements, capital/labour ratio, full-time employment, part-time 
employment and union density are all significant. The impact of agreements, the 
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capital/labour ratio and proportion of full-time employees are positive in sign, while the 
impacts of union density and proportion of part-time employment are negative in sign. 
Again the proportion of employees covered by bargaining agreements (EBAs) is identified as 
significant in determining Australia's labour productivity. The capital/labour ratio (k11 1 ), a 
measure of the capital intensity of the sector, increases industry labour productivity 
significantly. The nature of the employment contract is also important for the 
production/resources sector, in this instance it is the proportion of full-time employment that 
positively contributes to labour productivity, while as the proportion of part-time employment 
increase labour productivity decreases. Interestingly, union density is identified as having a 
negative, significant impact on labour productivity within the production/resources sector. 
The labour productivity model (3.2.3) is then applied to the service industries as a group. 
Capital/labour 0.2628273 6.10 	0.000 
Proportion of fte in the laboutlforce 1.529747  0.006 
Proportion of pte in the labour force I. , -0.070185 -0.80 0.000 
Proportion of employees covered by EI3Fks 0.0345935 
Union Density -0.1019091 -3.16 	0.002 
Wald Chi2 - 621.71 
Prob> Chi 2 0.0000 
Table 4.3: Results from the Estimation of (3.2.3) for Service Sector 
The service industries interpretation in Table 4.3 is identical to the interpretation that 
emerged from the production/resources sector. 
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The coefficients on agreements, capital/labour ratio, full-time employment, part-time 
employment and union density are all significant. The impact of agreements, the 
capital/labour ratio and proportion of full-time employees are positive in sign, while the 
impacts of union density and proportion of part-time employment are negative in sign. 
Again the proportion of employees covered by bargaining agreements (EBAs) is identified as 
significant in determining that sectors labour productivity. 
The final application applies equation (3.2.3) to the margins sector. The results of this final 
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Proportion of pte in the labour force l ft 1.844399 3.43 0.000 
Proportion of employees 	,E13As , covered by$ 0.114662,3, [ 6:11 x0.000 
Union Density 0.4431423 3.06 0.002 
Wald Chi 2 - 202.31 
Prob> Chi2 0.0000 
Table 4.4: Estimates of (3.2.3) for the Margins Sector 
In the margins industries EBAs are again significant and have a positive effect on labour 
productivity. However, while the variables are all still significant, the sector demonstrates 
some significant deviation from those preceding in the sign of the coefficients. The capital 
labour ratio has a significantly negative effect in contrast to the services sector and the 
production/resources sector where its impact is positive. The proportion of part-time 
employment is positive in sign, indicating the opposite compared with the two preceding 
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sectors. It appears that the sector is indifferent to the labour contract, both forms of 
employment contributing to increased labour productivity but with full time employment's 
contribution much larger. 
There are clearly some generally applicable results in the 4 models which we have 
estimated although there are also important inconsistencies across sub groups of Australian 
industries. These inconsistencies are discussed in the concluding Section. 
4.2.1. Interpretation 
To summarise, Table 4.5 presents the signed effects of the variables explaining industry 
Table 4.5: Summary of Signed Effects from (3.2.3) 
ns means not significant 
means a positive impact 
means a negative impact 
The results summarised in Table 4.5 suggest that the innovation of EBAs had a positive 
effect on Australian labour productivity. This is evidenced by the fact that in 4 replications of 
the productivity model (3.2.3) on 4 occasions the EBA variable is significantly positive. So 
the general conclusion from this study is that the EBA variable has enhanced Australian 
industry labour productivity. 
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The union effect is to reduce industry labour productivity in the production/resources and 
service sectors, but presents as positive in the margins sector. From an economy wide 
perspective, union density is identified as being insignificant in determining labour 
productivity. 
The nature of the employment contract creates a further interesting result. When considered 
across the economy as a whole as the proportion of part-time employment increases, labour 
productivity decreases. This finding is significant when the increased incidence of part-time 
employment increases, as it has done, in sectors of the Australian economy. The proportion 
of part-time employment is identified as having a positive impact only in the margins sector, 
but with a relatively low coefficient compared with the proportion of full-time employment. 
The higher is the proportion of full-time workers, the higher is labour productivity in that 
industrysector, this is particularly so in the production/resources and margins sectors and 
less so in the services sector. 
The capital/labour ratio in Australian industries generally has had a stimulating impact on 
industry labour productivity. This result may be explained by the labour saving or capital 
augmenting nature of technical change associated with increasing capital intensity in 
production. The notable exceptions to these arguments occurs in the margins sector of the 
economy where the pace of technical change has often been rapid. The rapidity of such 
change has been absorbed in the margins sector of the economy, but at substantial 
adjustment costs particularly in relation to the redeployment of labour. 
4.3. Wages Results Model 
The model applied to the analysis of the impact of enterprise bargaining on wages, reflects 
an empirical approach and practice applied in Australia and internationally. The structure is 
based on the Johnson, Mahar and Turnbull (1974) equation and reflects the approach taken 
by Wooden (2003), Kennedy and Borland (2000) where a vector of characteristics for 
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explanatory variables under consideration is added to variables identified as core 
determinants of wages as identified in the section above. 
The data set includes wage earnings per hour as the dependent variable, with explanatory 
variables Chain Volume Added per employee hour, the Capital Labour Ratio, Union Density, 
Price inflation (CPI) and the Unemployment Rate. 
In each of these four replications of (3.3.1.) the model is estimated by fixed effects. The 
choice of estimation approach was determined by the application of the Hausman (1978) 
test to the estimating equation. Prior tests for serial correlation and endogeneity, as 
described in Chapter 3 had determined the application of a FE or RE model as appropriate. 
The fixed effects version of the model allows for the possibility that the constant term in 
(3.3.1.) labelled a differs across individual industries although it must be stressed that 
these individual industry terms do not vary overtime. 
Some authors argue that a choice between FE or RE model should be made on the basis of 
a specification test such as the one proposed by Hausman (1978). Others, such as Hsiao 
(2003) suggest that the choice between RE and FE models will depend on the 
circumstances surrounding the presentation of the data set in each case. Application of the 
Hausmann (1978) test, indicated the appropriateness of the FE model and as such, it has 
been applied to the estimation of the wage equation 
The empirical explanation of industry wages provided above is estimated as a panel data 
model in four replications: the entire data set including all 17 classified ANZIC industries; the 
production and resource based sector; the margins sector and services sector. 
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4.3.1. Economy Wide 
Table 4.6. below, contains the results of the FE model used to determine (3.3.1.) for all 17 




Const. .0124899 9.69 




Unemployment Rate .0002106 1.58 
:Union Density [ -.000i5-3 1[. -1.07 L 
R2-Within 0.6225 
r-Fe- Between -71 0.2761 
R2- Overall 0.3016 
Wooldridge Test 0.017 
F(1,12) 
Prob>F 0.8985 
Hausmann Test 12.34 
Chi 2 (4) 
Prob> Chi 2 0.0150 
Table 4.6 Results of Estimating the Wage Relationship (3.3.1) for All Industries 
The value of the Wooldridge test statistic indicates that autocorrelation is not a serious 
problem in this model. Within and between effects measured by the respective R 2 indicate 
that the model provides a more complete explanation of within effects than it does for 
between effects. 
The outstanding result is that labour productivity is identified as having a highly significant 
and positive impact on wage earnings per hour. Interestingly, neither the CPI nor the 
unemployment rate are identified as significant at the economy wide level. The sign of the 
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significant variable reflects expectations, a positive relationship between productivity and 
wages. This is a strong indicator suggesting that the policy goal of increasing the nexus 
between wage rates adjustment and productivity, in preference to the inflation rate, is being 
achieved. 
The finding of an insignificant and negative impact of union density on wages requires some 
consideration. The union density variable is defined as the proportion of employees in the 
workforce who are union members. Union membership as a proportion of the workforce has 
declined for the past 20 years. Equating this trend, however, with a reduction in industrial 
influence is, according to Mulvey (1996) inappropriate given the benefits that have flowed to 
both union and non-union members from the bargaining process. In this event the result is 
not unexpected, the findings indicate a free rider effect by non union members for even as 
membership levels decline, earnings increase. This finding provides some evidence of the 
institutional approach to the industrial relations framework and the roles of the union and 
industrial commission in determination of earnings. The Australian industrial relations 
framework underpins enterprise based agreements with minimum conditions and provides 
national minimum wage adjustments impacting on earnings. These adjustments also 
mitigate the impact of over award payments, such processes are reasonably considered to 
be correlated with explanatory variables in this model. Additionally, union density is not 
necessarily a proxy for union activity in the bargaining process as argued in Chapter 3. 
While the results provide an indicator of the usefulness of the model at an economy wide 
dimension, Australia has not experienced the same growth characteristics across all of its 
industry sectors. The following analysis takes the same structure as applied to the analysis 
of productivity and examines the usefulness of the model in three sectors 
4.3.2 By Industry Sector 
It is possible that the economy wide results are not necessarily translated into each of the 
industry sectors defined in Chapter 3. As defined, the sectors are differentiated by their 
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business models, these reflecting different relationships between employee and employers 
based on, for example the role which labour plays relative to capital, the homogeneity of 
labour inputs, capacity for substitution, and the relative importance of human capital and 
motivational factors. This difference reflects insider power and internal labour market 
discussions Chapter 1 and 3. 
The 17 industries are classified into three sectors: the production/resources; services and 
margins sectors described in Chapter 3. Do different factors influence wage outcomes in 
these 3 sectors. The following tables provide answers to this question. 
Variable. 
Coefficient 
Const. 	 .0071713 	3.53 
Labour Productivity 	 .0016622 	2.57 
CPI 	 r-8.04e-06 	-1.16 
Unemployment Rate 	 -.0001146 	-0.54 
Union Density 	 -.0001881 	-0:72 
R2-Within 	 0.3922 
Between 	 0.7400 
R2- Overall 	 0.1617 
Table 4.7: Results of Estimating the Wage Relationship (3.3.1) for the Production/Resources 
Sector 
Within and between effects measured by the respective R 2 indicate that the model provides 
a more complete explanation of between effects than it does for within effects. 
Results from the estimation of the wages relationship for the production/resources sector 
provides similar results as those evident at the economy wide level. Labour productivity is 
again significant and positive, although the CPI, unemployment rate and union density are 
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not. 
These FE results for the production/resources sectors are similar to the FE model in Table 
(4-6), however they provide stronger results. In Table (4.6) when applied across all 17 
industries, the CPI and unemployment variable are approaching acceptable significance, 
whereas in Table (4.7), applied to the production/resources sector, they are less significant. 
The production/resources sector demonstrates the traditional neoclassical approach to the 
determination of earnings, substitution of labour with capital and use of unemployment to 
reduce earnings pressure, indicating a degree of homogeneity in the labour force and an 
ability to introduce new workers. The sector is characterised by the creation of products and 
as reflected by Matthews (1996) the introduction of lean production systems with a quality 
and efficiency focus based on standardised processes and systems. 
The characteristics of the production resources sector are fundamentally different to the 
services sector. The services sector is characterised by an output consumed by the 
customer as it is being provided, much of this is on the basis of interaction with an 
employee. In this service industry business model the direct employer dependence on the 
attributes of the employee for enterprise success is arguably greater than in the production 
resources sector. The results of the model applied to the group of service sector industries 








I 	6.94e-07 	0.09 
.0001832 	1.27 
.0001444 	I- 0.33 Union Density 
Coefficient 
	
.0178311 	!I I 
	10.12 
.0102559 	8.20 





R2-Within 	 0.6829 
R2- Between 	 0.5864 
R2- Overall 	 0.6283 
Table 4.8: Results from the Estimation of Wages Relationship (3.3.1.) for the Service Sector 
Within and between effects measured by the respective R2 indicate that the model provides 
a significant explanation for both between and within effects. 
In the case of the service industries the model provides the same economic interpretation for 
both the Production/Resources Sector and the economy overall. Only labour productivity 
provides a significant effect. The positive stimulation provided to wage earnings by 
productivity improvement is consistent throughout the analysis. In the services sector, the 
proportion of unemployment, while not reaching significance, is approaching it, potentially 
identifying the requirement for specialist skills within the sector. 
The remainder of the industry sectors have been characterised as the margins sector 
comprising, wholesale trade, retail trade, transport and storage, finance and insurance. The 
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Table 4.9: Estimates of Wage Relationship (3.3.1.) for the Margins Sector 
Within and between effects measured by the respective R 2 indicate that the model provides 
a very strong explanation for both between and within effects. 
In the margins industries productivity is again identified as the primary driver of wage 
earnings per hour. Interestingly, in this sector, the CPI variable is significant and negative; 
real wages rates fall. While the sign has been consistent throughout the application of the 
model thus far as the CPI rises, this is the only occasion on which the variable is significant. 
As intermediary organisations, many businesses in the sector are under price pressure from 
both customers and suppliers, for example transport firms are constantly under price and 
quality pressures from major retail or manufacturing customers. These sectors are not in a 
position to increase wage rates from sources other than productivity improvement. 
There are clearly some generally applicable results across the 4 models, although there are 
some important inconsistencies across sub groups of Australian industries. These 
inconsistencies are discussed in the concluding Section. 
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The following Table, 4.10 provides a summary of the signed effects of the variables 
explaining average wage earnings in Australia. 
Variables/Models 	 I la-onstant 
All Industries 
[CVAdpp I Price 	Union L_ 	 
- ns 	- ns 
Unemp I 
+ns 
Table 4.10: Summary of Signed Effects from (3.2.3) 
ns means not significant 
means a positive impact 
means a negative impact 
The results summarised on Table 4.10 suggest that the since 1993, earnings per hour have 
been primarily influenced by labour productivity. This finding is consistent across all industry 
groupings. The conclusion that wage earnings are motivated by productivity indicates a 
transition away from an externally decided wage fixing system based on changes to the cost 
of living to one where wages are driven in part by labour productivity. This is reinforced by 
the constant —ve sign on the CPI variable. This is a major realignment in the structure of the 
Australian economy. 
Of equal importance is the lack of significance in findings related to unemployment. This 
finding is consistent with the sticky nature of wage rates identified by authors such as 
Phillips(1958), Kennedy and Borland (2000) cited earlier in Chapters 2 & 3. This may be a 
reflection of the application of insider power arising from embodied human capital, the time 
and cost of training new employees and the opportunity cost associated with employees 
leaving. This relegates the overall level of unemployment to a redundant status in wage 
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negotiations. 
The lack of significance and ambiguity of union density is a finding to be treated with caution. 
While a traditional variable in such analyses its usefulness is questioned in the current 
environment of low levels of disputation and unions working to establish their position within 
the industrial system. The finding may be related to the coincidence of declining union 
membership and increasing real wage earnings. It should not be forgotten that EBAs have 
all been negotiated with unions. It is more an issue of union power than membership. While 
there is most likely a critical mass of membership required for relevance and the ability to 
represent the union as the collective voice, unions are still a major institution within the 
industrial relations system. As proposed by the institutional school, much of the industrial 
outcomes are a function of the interaction of the industrial institutions. Unions and employers 
understand their complementary roles and while some enterprises would prefer not to deal 
with unions, others prefer to continue to have an organised institution with whom to 
negotiate. It is also in the union's interest to achieve a positive result for its employees. In 
some instances the positive result is the continuity of the enterprise, rather than 
maximisation of short run wage improvement. 
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CHAPTER 5 - THE IMPACT OF THE POLICY TO 
DECENTRALISE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ON 
PRODUCTIVITY & WAGES - CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY 
IMPLICATIONS 
5.1. Introduction 
Australian enterprises have made a rapid transition to the EBA based industrial relations 
system that has allowed them to negotiate wages and conditions, subject to minimum 
standards, that reflect the specific needs of the enterprise and employees. Introducing EBAs 
has made a significant and positive contribution to labour productivity in the Australian 
economy. Over the same period, productivity has also become a significant and positive 
determinant of average earnings per hour. 
These findings are important because they indicate a major change in the foundations of the 
Australian economy and of the industrial relations system. They contrast the previous 
centralised award system where wage adjustments primarily reflected cost of living 
adjustments and an economy in which productivity improvement was largely derived from 
increases in scale of production as the domestic and international markets grew. The 
consequences of the centralised system were that when combined with structural 
inefficiencies, the economy was becoming globally uncompetitive. 
The findings indicate a virtuous relationship between the industrial relations system, as a 
contributor to labour productivity that then flows through to influence wage earnings, the 
country's competitiveness in the global market and living standards. 
During the transition period there has been a positive combination of output and productivity 
growth, relatively low inflation and containment of wages. Consumers have reaped the 
benefit of low priced consumer durable imports and domestic productivity improvement 
providing purchasing power improvement not dependent on increased earnings. This 
environment has allowed the export and import replacement sectors to compete more 
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effectively because productivity gains are not being eroded by excessive increases in labour 
input costs. 
The industrial relations system can be a catalyst for significant change. The centralised 
model arguably limited change by reducing the incentive to explore options. It was not 
benign, while providing rules relating to conditions and wage rates it effectively removed an 
important element of management from enterprises and with it the capability or desire to 
introduce innovation. The introduction of enterprise bargaining has raised awareness of the 
value of industrial relations and the use of enterprise agreements and their development 
process to improve productivity and business performance. 
The structure of this chapter conforms to the evaluation framework. The structure provides a 
summary of the results, revisits the policy objectives to provide a comparative analysis, 
develops conclusions as to the cause of the result and finally considers the current policy 
approach within the context of the findings of this analysis. 
5.2. Results of the Decentralisation Policy 
5.2.1. Impact on Productivity 
Introducing enterprise agreements has had a significant and positive impact on Australian 
labour productivity. 
The results at an economy wide level detailed in Chapter Four indicate a significant positive 
contribution to labour productivity, measured by chain volume added per employee hour as 
the agreements are introduced and updated. The capital labour ratio also demonstrates a 
significant, positive relationship with labour productivity. 
These findings lead to the conclusion that the introduction of decentralisation into the 
Australian industrial relations system, through the introduction of enterprise agreements, has 
achieved its labour productivity improvement objective. The above findings also indicate the 
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agreement process works in concert with capital in achieving that result. 
The results also indicate that the proportion of part-time employees is negatively and 
significantly related to productivity. This is a concerning result given the trend towards 
increasing levels of part-time employment across some sectors and indicates the need for 
caution in pursuing this policy, if productivity is the single objective. Interestingly at the all 
industries level, the proportion of full time employment was not found to be significant in 
determining labour productivity. 
All of the agreements in the sample were collective agreements, involving the union in 
negotiation, with the union as a signatory, however using union density as the explanatory 
variable, the finding is that the variable is not significant as a determinant of labour 
productivity. This result should be treated with caution, as there are arguments that union 
density is not an accurate proxy for union influence, Wooden (2003). While union 
membership as a measure of influence may indicate declining importance of the unions, 
they will remain significant while they are considered by other parties to be legitimate 
bargaining agents. 
The capital/labour ratio in Australian industries generally stimulates industry labour 
productivity. This positive relationship may be explained by the labour saving or capital 
augmenting nature of technical change associated with increasing capital intensity in 
production. As highlighted by the case studies in Chapter Two, the introduction of new 
technology in conjunction with behavioural change provides significant benefits both in terms 
of efficiency and quality. 
Within the production/resources, services and margins sectors, the impact of EBAs is 
consistent with results across the economy as a whole. However within the margins sector, 
there is a negative relationship between the capital/labour ratio and productivity and both 
forms of labour contract contribute to labour productivity. The sector is characterised by a 
relatively stable trend level of full time employment , with the growth in overall employment 
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derived from part-time positions. 
5.2.2. Impact on Wages 
The wage impact of introducing EBAs is indirect. It occurs through the influence of 
introducing EBAs on productivity that in turn, significantly and positively influences wage 
earnings per hour. 
The other significant finding is that wage earnings are not significantly influenced by the CPI, 
union density or the unemployment rate. The CPI result is a major change from the 
centralised system that was heavily influenced by this variable as the basis on which to 
maintain purchasing power. The unemployment result is consistent with the findings of 
Phillips (1958) and Borland & Kennedy (2002), indicating the stickiness of wages and little 
downwards pressure from increased unemployment. 
These findings were consistent across all sectors, the only exception being the negative 
significant relationship between the CPI and wage earnings in the service sector. Real 
wages in the sector are falling. This sector has recruited a large number of people who had 
previously been denied job opportunities, in many instances into part-time roles and at 
minimum wage levels. As a result this sector reflects the decline in wage earnings evident 
across the economy. 
The conclusion that wage earnings are positively affected by productivity represents a 
positive change in the Australian economy indicating a change in the accepted view of the 
nexus between the wage fixing system and changes to the cost of living and transition to 
one where wages are now driven in part by labour productivity. 
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5.3. Matching the Policy Objectives 
5.3.1. The Purpose of IR Reform 
The micro-economic reform of the Australian economy that commenced in the 1980s was in 
recognition of the need to improve the international competitiveness of the Australian 
Economy. Reform has continued to the present time although through the 1980s and 1990s 
major institutional foundations were dramatically altered. Central to this reform is the focus 
on improving productivity, where in comparison to world best practice, Australia has lagged 
in all sectors except for minerals extraction up to the 1990's. 
This relatively low productivity performance provided the impetus for reform of the Australian 
Industrial relations system and in particular the subsequent decision to decentralise 
industrial decision making by introducing enterprise bargaining as a mechanism to improve 
efficiency. An earlier introduction of a series of accords between the labour government and 
the unions had introduced efficiency concepts into the wage adjustment system, a 
fundamental change from the previous decades of adjustments primarily reflecting cost of 
living decision criteria. 
Additional reform introducing enterprise bargaining agreements was designed to align the 
industrial relations system to the needs of enterprises subject to minimum standards. 
Recognising the interdependency of employers and employees, these enterprise 
agreements were negotiated between worker and employer groups or their representatives. 
This accommodates the use of collective agreements, where the union represented the 
interests of employees or non-union agreements made directly between the employer and 
employees. 
While the early agreements contributed to improvements in technical efficiency, the concept 
of agreements supporting the enterprise to achieve better overall performance and to adapt 
to forecast future changes, has contributed to achievement of improvement in allocative 
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efficiency within enterprises. This internal orientation facilitated both improvements in 
efficiency and in the enterprise's effectiveness in meeting market opportunities. These 
results are consistent with reform policy objectives. 
The EBA mechanism and processes met the needs of employers and employees and has 
led to the development of a more appropriate industrial relations framework to the small, 
open nature of the Australian economy. 
5.4. How has the Policy Worked in Enterprises? 
The inputs to the bargaining process include employees, employers, unions and the values 
and resources brought by these parties. In the EBA model the bargaining process reflected 
a high level of consultation and consideration of important issues for both employers and 
employees. Critically, the negotiation results are formalised in agreements that confirm both 
the criteria for wage outcomes and often for organisational development initiatives agreed 
upon. These agreements are relatively short term, often three years, as a result requiring 
ongoing review and renegotiation 
5.4.1. Convergence of Organisational Development and Industrial Relations Theory 
and Practice 
The convergence of the two fields occurred through a process of organisational learning. 
The agreeing to agree outcome, signed off with an associated wage increase of early 
agreements reflected a lack of knowledge and experience of both parties in approaching 
these agreements. The recognition and subsequent demonstration of EBAs potential as a 
mechanism with which to negotiate, legitimise, implement and reinforce organisational 
change as a pathway to improved business and economic performance created a 
momentum that saw many enterprises implementing innovative change and improvement. 
The case studies included in Chapter Two provide some evidence of the change in the 
management, employee and business focus that occurred across all sectors of the 
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economy. The NILS findings in relation to organisational characteristics such as 
improvement in relationships between employers and employees and the ability to introduce 
change reinforced the conclusion that these approaches were widespread. 
The positive productivity and indirect wages effects occurred because the strategic, 
operations delivery and human/industrial relations elements of an enterprise were 
considered and adapted as an integrated system. When considered as a system it can be 
demonstrated that a change in one element can have positive or negative effects on other 
elements. These changes could be contractually agreed between the employer and 
employees in agreements having legal standing. This provided both the ability and 
confidence for an enterprise to act on these elements and importantly identified the benefit 
of so doing. 
5.4.2. People's Engagement in the Process 
The sample of agreements used in this study was collective agreements registered in the 
federal jurisdiction. These agreements include both the employer and unions, as employee 
bargaining representatives and signatories. While the unions are signatories, the practice 
generally involves employees in the detailed design and development of an agreement. 
Union involvement ranges from being the bargaining agent through to employee mentoring 
and advising roles. 
It is this notion of collectivism and involvement as causal factors in the success of enterprise 
agreements that is addressed in this section. 
Organisations are collaborative endeavours formed for a purpose where an individual 
cannot, in isolation, achieve that purpose. As highlighted in Chapter Two, different 
organisational forms are required for different purposes. The degree to which an employee 
is committed to the purpose of the enterprise and their efforts aligned to strategic tasks and 
performance requirements, the greater is the potential for high levels of performance. 
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It can be argued that the establishment of processes to facilitate this engagement has been 
a major contribution of the decentralised industrial relations framework. While it is not argued 
that many of the consultative mechanisms and organisation development practices were not 
previously applied, the linkage to the industrial relations system ensured they were applied 
and then the results were legitimised in the agreement. 
The connection between action and outcome meant that the industrial relations system 
became relevant to all those in the game through its direct linkage of change, performance 
and reward. 
There are two important conclusions from this, which relate to issues of scale and relevance. 
The reorientation of the industrial relation system to the enterprise level ensured the 
industrial relations system complemented the balance of the business system thereby 
completing that system. This ensured that initiatives, agreements and associated outcomes 
were relevant and beneficial to the players and therefore worth the effort of involvement. 
What is the optimum socio-economic and therefore industrial unit from an organisational 
sense? If work is a collective activity an enterprise wide agreement can be used to create a 
logical and relevant effort/reward system. Where the results are highly dependent on the 
individual's performance, such as in elements of the service sector, an individual approach 
may be a more relevant scale, whereas in the production resources sector where there is a 
high capital dependency and labour is more homogenous, the enterprise scale is more 
reflective of the environment and contribution. 
The reorientation of industrial relations to an enterprise level leads to the conclusion that the 
enterprise scale is closer to the optimum than was the centralised system. 
5.4.3. Cultural Change — Transition from an Inputs to Outcomes Focus within 
Enterprises 
The connection of the strategic, operational delivery and human/industrial relations elements 
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of the business system supported a change in the focus of payment and reward. 
Australia's centralised wage system was based on input time. Adjustments were argued on 
cost of living increases and translated into a change in the reward per hour of attendance at 
work, this made allowance for the inconvenience associated with working extended hours or 
when other workers are enjoying recreational days. Employers argued against adjustments 
on an input cost basis. 
The transition to the enterprise agreement structure has resulted in consultation that broke 
the nexus between input time and reward. This commenced with annualised salaries a 
process where employees worked the hours required to get the work done, the change 
achieving outcomes such as reduced levels of overtime worked, while giving the enterprise 
certainty in its wage bill. 
The case studies included in Chapter Two provide an indication of the move to reward 
based on both the quantity and quality of outputs and outcomes. These indicators are used 
for example, to structure career progression through a classification structure or for 
performance oriented bonus systems, they provide an unambiguous connection between the 
employee and the purpose of the enterprise in the context of the employee's contribution. 
5.4.4. Outputs from the Negotiation 
In Chapter Two it was identified that the majority of agreements were focused on wages and 
associated initiatives, and less on productivity agreements. A few comprehensive 
(productivity and change) agreements replaced most award provisions. In effect most 
agreements were to be read in conjunction with parent awards. 
The agreement negotiation process tended to legitimise issues of concern in relation to the 
performance of the enterprise from both the employer and employee perspective while a 
formal agreement formalised the outcomes sought, and associated performance rewards. 
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The construction of a contract at the enterprise level provided a strong vehicle as a basis for 
review and evaluation, a process missing in many enterprises prior to the bargaining era. 
5.5. Why has the Policy Worked? 
The wages result, when considered in conjunction with the productivity finding, provides a 
strong measure of the success of policies to decentralise the industrial relations system to 
an enterprise level. Wooden (2005) concludes the earlier centralised industrial relations 
system resulted in employer apathy about industrial relations, the enterprise based system 
has not only reduced apathy but awakened many employers to the potential of industrial 
relations as a key element of the management system, in improving enterprise performance. 
Tseng &Wooden (2003) had earlier concluded that enterprise agreements had contributed to 
Australia's improving productivity, but indicated there was a shortage of plausible 
explanation. 
Chapter Two of this dissertation attempts to place the introduction of agreements as one 
part of an enterprise system, as indicated, a tool to legitimise and formalise issues central to 
enterprise performance, thereby providing a linkage between performance and reward. 
Agreements were negotiated with a high level of involvement, relative to earlier approaches 
in many organisations, thus contributing to joint decisions and the necessary commitment 
and motivation to implement terms of the award. 
It can be argued that the timing of the introduction of bargaining was also fortuitous. In 
Chapter One we indicated there was an existing framework of organisational development 
potential, an new industrial relations and an economic imperative that in combination 
provided the appropriate environment for significant change. In some organisations where 
participative approaches had been previously applied, the ability to negotiate enterprise 
agreements provided a mechanism to formalise and reward for positive change. In 
organisations without such a history, the enterprise agreement provided the catalyst for the 
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initiation of such change, learning from others experiences. 
Success in implementation at an aggregate level has contributed to a virtuous cycle of 
improved productivity leading to reduced costs leading to reduced inflationary pressure. In 
part this cycle is supported by low cost consumer durables from emerging economies such 
as China and India. 
The results at the enterprise, sector and economy wide levels have combined to legitimise 
the approach, the system and the specific output that is an enterprise agreement. 
5.6. Evidence Based Policy, the Potential for and Impact of Further 
Decentralisation 
The issue is raised as a concern that is inherent in policy. In this policy example if some 
decentralisation has been good, more will be better. 
The "WorkChoices" legislation was passed by the Australian Parliament in December 2005, 
it's stated objective is for a simpler, national workplace relations system for Australia (DEWR 
2005). 
This legislation provides for a number of significant initiatives, including: 
• Centralisation of the industrial relations system within the federal jurisdiction; 
• Application of the Corporations Power to establish the system in the event of the 
States not conforming to the decision; 
• Removal of the responsibility for the establishment of minimum wages from the 
Australian Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC) and establishing the Australian 
Fair Pay Commission (AFPC) to establish these minimum wage rates; 
• Removal from awards, those conditions that are already prescribed in legislation and 
establishing by legislation a range of minimum conditions, including dismissal 
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provisions. In combination with the wage rates established by the AFPC, these will 
become the "Australian Fair Pay and Conditions Standard", the stated aim is to 
simplify the "no disadvantage" test for agreements and to ensure consistent minimum 
standards for agreements; 
• The role of the AIRC will be limited to the resolution of disputes; 
• The process for making and lodging agreements will be simplified with agreements 
being effective from the date of lodgement with the Office of the Employment 
Advocate (OEA) rather than from the date of certification or approval. 
• Alterations to unfair dismissal laws and exemption for employers with less than 100 
employees. 
The other principle element of the federal government's philosophy is the application of 
Australian Workplace Agreements (AWA) an agreement between the employer and an 
individual as the primary form of contract in preference to enterprise agreements. 
The implications of these changes are wide reaching in terms of role and responsibility. The 
introduction of the Australian Fair Pay Commission effectively removes the role of the union 
movement and employer organisations in the establishment of minimum wage rates and 
with minimum conditions set in legislation from their negotiation as well. The application of 
the Corporation Power, to replace Conciliation and Arbitrations powers negates the need for 
a dispute to trigger change and could if applied at its limits result in an award free industrial 
environment Wooden (2000). 
The Corporations Power allows government to establish legislation "imposing obligations on, 
or in favour of, trading, financial or overseas corporations" and is considered by Creighton 
and Stewart (1994) to be consistent with the regulation of virtually any aspect of a 
corporation's labour relations. This means all registered corporations must comply with such 
legislation. The corporate model is fundamentally different to the legal framework of the 
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current. AIRC. 
Simplification and streamlining are catch cries and admirable objectives, however given the 
complexity of the system and range of factors affecting the development and sustainability of 
a highly productive and adaptive business systems it is critical that the policy initiative not be 
simplistic. The current enterprise focused system has delivered strong productivity growth. 
This is argued to be a function of the associated processes, employee involvement and 
results/reward focus of the manner in which the policy was implemented at the enterprise 
level. There is little existing evidence to support the view that the proposed changes would 
assist or constrain this enterprise model which is starting to prove its worth. 
However the same conclusion does not apply if the model is to promote the application of 
AWAs as the dominant agreement mechanism. Organisations are collective, collaborative 
enterprises, required when an individual is incapable of producing the product or service in 
isolation. Following this observation and the discussion of organisational development 
theory, in particular aspects of wages as motivators or in some instances demotivators, the 
notion was extended to the definition of the optimum socio-economic work and industrial 
unit. This optimum reflects the size and characteristics of the unit based on where output 
can be corralled to enable people's performance to be identified and as a result a 
measurable reward determined which is based on their performance, independent of 
significant external influence. There are relatively few instances in an enterprise where this 
principle can be applied to the individual. Individual agreements in a collective work 
environment may raise significant barriers to performance. 
From an organisation's perspective, the transaction cost of negotiating separate 
agreements, beyond the performance reviews that are generally part of the management 
process, may be costly. 
This example is provided only to identify the risk of reducing allocative efficiency and 
introducing demotivating factors if the focus of the industrial relations system at the 
124 
enterprise level fails to reflect the business context. 
The current enterprise focused model has delivered significant benefits to the Australian 
economy, appears to have created the environment for sustained productivity growth and in 
combination with other factors contained inflation. The implementation of the current policy 
must protect the convergence of organisation development and industrial theory and 
practice at the enterprise level that contributed much to those outcomes. 
Central to the process is the distribution of power in the negotiation process. The current 
system has a number of institutional players providing a balance in the power exercised in 
negotiation. The promulgation of individual agreements, particularly for new, inexperienced 
workers, may move the power from balance to a bias in favour of the employer, resulting in 
these employees accepting lower wages. Fairbairn (2005) argues that this will enable more 
inexperienced people to enter the workforce, gain experience and from this achieve higher 
pay levels and in the short run the low wage is augmented by the social security system. 
This reinforces the "insider power" argument put forward by Layard (1991) with its potential 
to create considerable wage differential within organisations that are not necessarily based 
on either traditional classification structures or real productivity difference, e.g. in the outputs 
sector where capital intensity is critical to output and productivity. Motivational theory 
highlights the critical importance in relativities and perceptions of equity to productivity. 
Individualising these factors may tend to work against the effective collective action that is 
required from a work unit. 
It is clear that the transition to a more individualised industrial relations system introduces a 
new level of complexity to the business system, it is less clear that moving from an 
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Date Sources: 
Gprod: Index variable, base = 1999 = 100, ABS 5204.0 Australian System of National 
Accounts, Table 22, Indexes of Gross Product Per Hour Worked, by Industry (a). Union: 
ABS 6310, Trade Union membership in thousands by industry. 
Labour: ABS 6291.0.40.001: Labour Force (EJ) Employed — Industry— Australia — Quarterly: 
Tables 9g and 9h: Full Time Employed and Part-Time Employed by Industry. 
Capital Labour Ratio: ABS 5204.0 Australian System of National Accounts, Table 68. Capital 
Stock, by Industry: created by using end of year net-capital stock from this series and the 
labour force from above and combining with 6302.0 Average Weekly Earnings, Australia. 
Table 01. Average Weekly Earnings by Industry, Australia (Dollars) — Original — Persons, 
Total Earnings. 
EBA: Data supplied on request by DEWRSB, number of employees under wage agreements 
specified measured in thousands by particular industries. Observations: data range 1991- 
2004. 
Industries covered: Mining, Manufacturing, Electricity, Gas and Water, Construction, 
Wholesale Trade, Retail Trade, Accommodation Cafes and Restaurants, Transport and 
Store, Communications, Finance and Insurance, and Cultural and Recreational Services, 
Personal and other services, education, Health and Community Services, Government 
Administration and Defence, Agriculture Forestry and Fishing, Property and Business 
Services. 
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